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HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE: DETERMINING THE
APPROPRIATE "TURF" FOR WILLIAMS V NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND CLARIFYING
PREEMPTION PRECEDENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2009 survey of former National Football League ("NFL")
players, approximately nine percent of the sample group admitted
to steroid use during their professional careers; however, sports
writers and bloggers alike acknowledge that the use of steroids in
the NFL is far more prevalent.' Drug use in professional sports is
an issue that has permeated numerous organizations and leagues
throughout the past few decades.2 Professional sports' drug poli-
cies are generally grounded in three principles: (1) the substances
"threaten fairness and integrity of athletic competition on the play-
ing field," since athletes who take steroids can gain a competitive
advantage; (2) steroids threaten athletes' health; and (3) steroid
use by professional athletes "sends the wrong message to young
1. See Retired NFL Players Admit Steroid Use in Survey, CBC SPoars (Feb. 20, 2009,
3:46 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/sports/football/story/2009/02/19/nflrpa-steroid-
survey.html (reporting findings of 2009 study published in American Journal of
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation). The 2009 study focused on the correlation
between steroid use and iusculoskeletal injuries among NFL players. See id. (dis-
cussing context of study). See Haslett Says '70 Steelers Made Steroids Popular in NFL,
CBS SPoRTs (Mar. 24, 2005), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/8322840 (com-
menting on popularization of steroid use during 1970s, when steroid use was le-
gal); Mark Maske & Leonard Shapiro, NFL's Steroid Policy Gets Kudos on Capitol Hill,
WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2005, at DO, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A21734-2005Apr28.html (suggesting statistics are not indicative of
actual prevalence of performance-enhancing drug use). Representative Henry
Waxman said, "[t]he percentage of NFL players who test positive for steroids is
very low.. .. Is this because the policy is working, or is this because players have
figured out how to avoid detection?" Id.
2. SeeJeffrey Katz, Should We Accept Steroid Use in Sports?, NPR (Jan. 23, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=18299098 ("A report by
former Sen. George Mitchell, released in December, mentioned dozens of baseball
players as having used steroids and described their use as 'widespread.' Track star
Marion Jones pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about steroid use in October
[2007]. And last summer [2007], several riders were dismissed from the Tour de
France on charges of using banned substances."); Ethan Lock, The Legality Under
the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts by National Football League Owners to Unilat-
erally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FIA. L. REV 1, 3, 7-8 (1987) (sunmmariz-
ing history of drug use in professional sports, in particular, football, and impetus
for drug testing in league); Paul Susic, Substance Abuse Among Athletes, FOUNDATION
OF SPORT AND EXERCISE PSYCHOLOGY, (May 28, 2009) http://www.psychtreatment.
com/substance abuseamong-athletes.htm (providing overview of issues of drug
use and abuse among professional athletes and Olympians).
(203)
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people who may be tempted to use them," particularly high school
and college athletes.3 One commentator hypothesized that fans
may more readily accept NFL players' performance enhancing drug
use because of the physicality professional football requires and the
entertainment value these players provide to fans. 4 Regardless of
the motivation for consumption of illicit drugs, it is undeniable that
drug use damages athletes physically, psychologically, and
professionally.5
A 2009 case, Williams v. National Football League,6 brought na-
tional attention to some of the inherent issues with collectively bar-
gained drug policies when an organization has employees
3. See National Football League Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances,
NFL, 31, 33-34 (Jun. 21, 2007) http://www.patscap.com/drugpolicy.pdf [hereinaf-
ter "NFL STEROIDS PoLIcY (2007)] (explaining rationale behind strict steroid pol-
icy, specifically in National Football League). Similar policies govern athletes in
the NHL, NBA, MLB, and Olympic Games. See Drug Testing Program Summary,
NHLPA, http://www.nhlpa.com/About-Us/Drug-Testing-Program-Summary/
(last visited Sept. 17, 2011) (outlining procedure for drug testing in NHL and
possible sanctions for violation); L. Elaine Halchin, Anti-Doping Policies: The Olym-
pics and Selected Professional Sports, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Apr. 29, 2005), at 9-
13, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2423.pdf (compar-
ing policies of Olympics, MLB/MLBPA, NBA/NBPA, and NFL/NFLPA). Recent
efforts to employ the WADA to administer NFL drug tests sends a message about
how seriously the NFL takes their drug policy. See Katz, supra note 2 ("The use of
performance-enhancing drugs is not accidental; it is planned and deliberate with
the sole objective of getting an unfair advantage. I don't want my kids, or your
kids, or anybody's kids to have to turn themselves into chemical stockpiles just
because there are cheaters out there who don't care what they promised when they
started to participate. I don't want my kids in the hands of a coach who would
encourage, condone, or allow the use of drugs among his or her athletes."); Lock
supra note 2, at 3 (emphasizing "infatuation" with professional athletes).
4. See Tim Keown, NFL and WADA? No Thanks, ESPN (May 10, 2011), http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?id=6520270 (discussing poten-
tially more lenient standard to which NFL players are held).
[Fans] don't know the extent of it, but they can guess a little bit, and
they're OK with the idea that a lot of these guys probably have to do
something extra to play such a brutal game at such a high level week after
week.... Maybe because most people never envisioned themselves being
able to play in the NFL, everybody is a little more lenient when it comes
to whatever substances guys put into their bodies to provide a nation with
Sunday entertainment.
Id.
5. See e.g. A Guide for Understanding Steroids and Related Substances, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTIcE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF DIVERSION CON-
TROL (Mar. 2004), http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/brochures/steroids/
professionals/index.html (warning about potential ramifications of steroid use);
Anabolic Steroids, ESPN (Sept. 6, 2007), http://espn.go.com/special/s/drugsand-
sports/steroids.html (detailing dangers of anabolic steroid use and some physical
and behavioral side effects).
6. 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009).
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"working" in more than one state.7 The case was hailed as the
"Super Bowl of litigation" due to its potential to drastically impact
the use of uniform drug policies in the NFL. 8 Throughout the past
few years, commentators have continually noted the importance of
the outcome of this case on the future of collective bargaining
agreements ("CBAs") in professional sports." In fact, one commen-
tator opined that this case is one of the top five cases likely to
change the face of sports law.' 0 Travis Tygart, chief of U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency, agreed, calling Williams the "most significant . . .
challenge" to collectively bargained drug policies in the United
States." Confounding precedent and the lack of a uniform stan-
7. SeeJaime Koziol, Note, Touchdown for the Union: Why the NFL Needs an Instant
Replay in Williams v. NFL, 9 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 137, 161 (2010) (describing
implications of case and scope of issue of collectively bargained agreements when
employees are not limited to one state). "The holding will not stay confined to the
NFL and the Minnesota Vikings Players; instead, it extends to all employers who
have grown accustomed to relying on the power of negotiation to tailor CBAs with
large groups of employees spread out over several states." Id.
8. See Roger 1. Abrams, StarCaps Anyone?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 20, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-i-abrams/starcaps-anyone-b_241651.html
(noting importance of holding in this case for future sports litigation and vast
number of areas of law this case tackles). The case has "created full employment
for sports and labor lawyers." Id. Over two decades ago, a 1987 article suggested
the value of a unilateral, league-wide policy. See Lock, supra note 2, at 5 (calling
unilateral policies advocated by team owners "a ... useful solution to a complex
problem.").
9. See Amy Tracy, Note, Athletic Discipline for Non-Sport Player Misconduct: The
Role of College Athletic Department and Professional League Discipline and the Legal Sys-
tem's Penalties and Remedies, 9 VA. SPoRTs & ENr. L. J. 254, 263 (2010) ("This inci-
dent represents the clash between the ultimate authority of the legal system and
the self-implemented powers of professional leagues."); Wayne Coffey, NFL Com-
missioner Roger Goodell Finds Congressional Ally in Attempt to Suspend Two Vikings Play-
ers, NY DAILY NEWS (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/
2009/11/03/2009-11-03_goodell-seeks-congressional help.html (explaining im-
portance of case and potential implications if Eighth Circuit's holding stays);
Michael S. Schmidt, Ruling Against NFL Could Affect Other Sports, HEARST NEWSPA-
PEws (Sept. 19, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-19/sports/17206787_1
anti-doping-agency-court-ruling-alcohol-testing (suggesting importance and rele-
vance of case). This case has the potential to impact the efficacy of drug policies in
all of the major United States professional sports leagues, including the NFL, MLB,
NBA, and NHL. See id. (projecting ruling could interfere with efficacy of other
leagues' disciplinary schemes).
10. See Shaun Assael, Five Lawsuits That Will Change Sports, ESPN INsIDER (Nov.
8, 2010), http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/blog/_/name/assaelshaun/id/
5780468 (predicting important upcoming sports litigation and listing this case as
one of top five lawsuits that could change sports law).
11. Schmidt, supra note 9. The Eighth Circuit's holding presents an impedi-
ment to collectively-bargained drug policies and the NFL's ability to punish players
for violating the league's drug policy. See id. (describing doubts raised concerning
drug-testing programs of professional sports in United States as result of ruling).
2012] 205
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dard for the oft-quoted notion of "inextricably intertwined" compli-
cated the analysis of this case.12
Williams moved through the Minnesota state judicial system
through a number of appeal proceedings in 2009 and 2010.'1 The
NFL even petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States; how-
ever, the Court denied certiorari on November 8, 2010.14 On April
28, 2011, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied a review of the ap-
peals court's decision, marking the end of the Williams litigation.15
As of the beginning of the 2011-2012 season, Pat and Kevin Wil-
liams were required to serve suspensions for their drug policy
violations.' 6
Although this case was litigated in 2009, and ultimately re-
solved in 2011, Williams v. AFL is still at the forefront of sports litiga-
tion debates.' 7 This article discusses the influential case of Williams
v. NFL and the subsequent need for clarification of preemption
precedent. Part II of the article provides a detailed discussion of
the background of the relevant NFL documents; section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and previous cases
12. For a further discussion of confusion about preemption doctrine, see infra
notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
13. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 598 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2009) (deny-
ing petition for rehearing en banc). The Minnesota Court of Appeals reaffirmed
the NFL's authority to suspend both Williams from four NFL games on February 8,
2011. See Amy Forliti, Appeals Court Won't Block 2 Vikings Suspensions, WINONA DAILY
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2011, 11:51 PM), http://www.winonadailynews.com/sports/arti-
cle_c l6dfBcO-3410-11eO-89b4-001cc4c03286.html (reporting Minnesota Court of
Appeals will not "permanently block" NFL from issuing suspensions to both Wil-
liams). When the Winona Daily News published this article, there was a possibility
that the players would appeal the decision to the state Supreme Court. See Jon
Krawzcynski, Kevin Williams Hasn't Heard About Suspension, NBC SPoRTs (Jul. 31,
2011, 5:51 PM), http://scores.nbcsports.msnbc.com/fb/story.asp?i=201107311924
17404385808 (explaining that in April 2011, "the Minnesota Supreme Court de-
clined to hear [the] appeal").
14. See generally Nat'l Football League v. Williams, 131 S.Ct. 566 (2010) (deny-
ing petition for writ of certiorari).
15. See Michael David Smith, AEL Declares Victory in StarCaps Case, NBC SPoRTs
(Apr. 28, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://profootbalItalk.nbcsports.com/2011/04/28/nfl-
declares-victory-in-starcaps-case/ (discussing conclusion of StarCaps litigation).
16. For a further discussion of punishment imposed, see infra note 270 and
accompanying text.
17. See e.g., Goodell: No decision on Williamses Until Case Closes, MINN. STAR TRIB.
(Mar. 22, 2011, 11:02 PM), http://www.startribune.com/sports/vikings/1184757
39.html (proving continued relevance of Williams litigation); Christopher Gates,
Could Williams Wall Still Escape Bogus Suspension?, DAILY NORSEMAN (ul. 31, 2011,
5:51 PM), http://www.dailynorseman.com/2011/7/31/2308076/could-williams-
wall-still-escape-bogus-suspension ("Since the suspensions [of Pat Williams and Ke-
vin Williams] will be handed out under the new CBA, it might be possible ...
though not highly likely . . . that the NFL could apply any agreement reached
under this CBA retroactively, thereby voiding these suspensions. ... But, the book
isn't completely closed on this story yet. We'll have to see what happens.").
[Vol. 19: p. 203
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that have addressed preemption; and the relevant Minnesota state
laws, the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act
("DATWA") and the Minnesota Consumable Products Act
("CPA")."' Part III analyzes the Court's rationale and suggests the
policy implications of the decision." Part IV discusses the potential
impact this case could have on future drug policies and suggestions
for drafting effective CBAs, as well as the Supreme Court's role in
potentially elucidating this area of law.20
II. FACTS
Williams presented the issue of whether a state or federal court
should evaluate professional football players' employment claims,
focusing on whether section 301 of the LMRA preempted the play-
ers' specific, statutory claims.2 ' During random drug testing in July
and August 2008, Minnesota Vikings players Kevin Williams and Pat
Williams tested positive for bumetanide. 22 The Williamses had
taken StarCaps, a banned diuretic and weight-loss supplement that
contains bumetanide to meet their weight goals and earn monetary
bonuses.23 Bumetanide can mask the presence of performance-en-
18. For firther information about the background issues, see infra notes 53-
130 and accompanying text.
19. For a further analysis of the court's reasoning, an evaluation of court's
arguments, and possible policy implications, see infra notes 131-250 and accompa-
nying text.
20. For a further discussion of impact of Williams litigation, see infra notes
251-285 and accompanying text. Though the case at issue was decided in the
Eighth Circuit on September 11, 2009, the impact section incorporates post-litiga-
tion developments and subsequent legal proceedings.
21. See Benjamin B. Hanson, Comment, Defend the Williams Wall, Leave Profes-
sional Sports Drug Testing Policies in Shambles: The Decision and Consequences of Williams
v. NFL, 33 HAMLINF L. REv. 327, 330 (2010) (reviewing litigation history through
state and federal courts and summarizing crux of case); David J. Duddleson & V.
John Ella, NFL Players' Minnesota Drug Testing Claims Not Preempted by Federal Law,
Eighth Circuit Rules, JACKSON LEiis LLP (Sept. 23, 2009), http://wwwjacksonlewis.
com/resources.php?NewslD=1859 (discussing section 301 preemption as it relates
to collectively bargained agreements). Section 301 preemption would send the
case to the federal court system. See id. (summarizing preemption process and
NFL desire to litigate in federal court based on LMRA preemption).
22. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 870 (8th Cir. 2009)
(providing background of case and why Kevin and Pat Williams were suspended,
thus setting off firestorm of litigation). Kevin Williams and Pat Williams (Minne-
sota Vikings) and Charles Grant, Deuce McAllister, and Will Smith (New Orleans
Saints) tested positive; however, the Williams case primarily concerns Kevin and Pat
Williams based on their state law claims under Minnesota law. See id. (listing play-
ers who tested positive for bumetanide).
23. See Complaint at *5, Williams v. Nat'l Football League, No. 08CV06255,
2008 WL 5110342 (D. Minn. 2008) (discussing Williams' use of StarCaps and po-
tential financial incentives). The Williams deny ever having taken anabolic ster-
oids, or masking or diluting urine samples. See id. (noting neither player has
2012] 207
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hancing drugs in an individual's system. 24 At the time that the Wil-
liamses took StarCaps, bumetanide was not listed as an ingredient
on the drug label; however, the Williamses allege that NFL officials
knew that StarCaps contained bumetanide years before this litiga-
tion commenced.2 5 In fact, in 2006, laboratory tests confirmed that
StarCaps contained bumetanide; this information was shared with
Adolpho Birch, NFL Vice President of Labor Law and Labor Policy,
and Dr. John Lombardo, independent administrator of the NFL's
Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances ("Policy").26
Birch informed the president, general manager, and head athletic
history of violating Policy). Kevin and Pat Williams assert that they would not have
taken StarCaps had they known that the product contained a prohibited sub-
stance, particularly since both men have medical conditions that bumetanide
could have adversely affected. See id. (listing factual allegations). See also Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order forJudgment at *2, Williams v. Nat'l Foot-
ball League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, 2010 WL 1793130 (D. Minn. 2010) (confirming
both Kevin and Pat had weight clauses in their contracts with Minnesota Vikings).
The court noted that the Williamses were medically and financially incentivized to
take StarCaps because: Kevin had knee surgery and found that he felt better when
he was carrying less body weight; Pat has high blood pressure and gout and
benefitted from maintaining a lower body weight; and Kevin could receive a
$400,000 bonus for meeting weight requirements, though he was ineligible for this
bonus if he used any "last minute weight-reducing tactics" including excessive use
of a steam room, diuretics, or fasting. See id. at *2-4 (discussing Williamses' medi-
cal issues and financial incentives for losing weight); see also Brad Childress Not
Source of Williams Leak, FOX (Mar. 12, 2010, 10:42 AM), http://www.myfoxtwinci-
ties.com/dpp/news/minnesota/brad-childress-not-source-williams-starcaps-leak-
mar-12-2010 (noting Williamses' admitted reason for taking StarCaps to facilitate
weight loss and receive bonuses); judge Says He'll Stay Suspensions if Vikes Appeal,
SPORTS IL[LUSTRATED (May 21, 2010, 2:47 AM), http://m.si.com/news/2627690
(reporting Williamses' use of StarCaps, a weight-loss supplement containing
bumetanide, a diuretic).
24. SeeJohn Jasper, NFL Players Pat & Kevin Williams Tested Positive for Banned
Substance Bumetanide, BETTOR, INC., http://blogs.bettor.com/NFL-Players-Pat-Ke-
vin-Williams-Tested-Positive-for-Banned-Substance-Bumetanide-al 3703 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011) (providing information about bumetanide, identifying it as banned
under NFL policy).
25. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 871 (alleging NFL officials knew about ingredi-
ents of StarCaps and intentionally withheld information from players); Abrams,
supra note 8 ("One problem (actually one of the many problems with the case) is
that the label for StarCaps did not list bumetanide as an ingredient."); Pat and
Kevin Williams of Minnesota Vikings Acknowledges Contract Barred Diuretic Use, ESPN
(Mar. 10, 2010, 8:34 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4982523
(reporting Williamses' denials of having knowledge that StarCaps contained pro-
hibited substance).
26. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 869 (confirming Birch's and Lombardo's knowl-
edge of presence of bumetanide in StarCaps). The Williams alleged that NFL rep-
resentatives intentionally mismanaged this information. See id. at 871-72
(describing NFL officials' alleged knowledge that StarCaps contained bumetanide
but failure to disclose this to players). Doctors Lombardo and Finkle, as well as
Birch, were eventually dismissed from the case. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order forJudgment at *13, Williams v. Nat'l Football League, No. 27-
CV-08-29778, 2010 WL 1793130 (D. Minn. 2010) (reporting dismissal of parties
[Vol. 19: p. 203
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trainers of each team that players were not permitted to endorse
the company that made StarCaps; however, Birch did not specifi-
cally disclose that StarCaps contained a prohibited substance.2? Pe-
ter Ginsberg, counsel for the Williamses, claimed that Birch showed
disregard for the players' health and safety and alleged that the
NFL breached its fiduciary duty to the players by withholding this
information.28 Ginsberg also alleged that the punishments inflicted
on his clients violated the Americans with Disabilities Act since both
of the Williamses are obese and they used StarCaps to facilitate
medically necessary weight loss. 29 Nonetheless, the NFL has a strict
liability drug policy, making the Williamses' taking of StarCaps suffi-
cient to warrant punishment regardless of whether they knew that
the diuretic contained a banned substance.30 The players admitted
from suit). Finkle was dismissed on April 14, 2009; Birch and Lombardo on March
8, 2010. See id. (providing background of parties to action).
27. See id. at 869-70 (saying only that player endorsements of and business
relationships with StarCaps were banned); Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v.
Nat'l Football League, 654 F.Supp.2d 960, 964 (D. Minn. 2009) (describing lack of
communication about ingredients in StarCaps). The lab urged Birch to report the
findings to the Food & Drug Administration ("FDA"); however, Birch chose not to
follow this directive. See id. (referencing court documents indicating Birch's deci-
sion not to report findings to FDA).
28. See Complaint at *2, Williams v. Nat'l Football League, No. 08CV06255,
2008 WL 5110342 (D. Minn. 2008) (alleging breach of fiduciary duty by NFL offi-
cials including Dr. Lombardo, Dr. Finkle, and Mr. Birch); Sean Jensen, Vikings Pat
and Kevin Williams Sue NFL Over Four-Game Suspension, TwIN CiTlEs.coM (Dec. 3,
2008, 5:23 PM), http://www.twincities.com/ci 11 121347?source=most viewed
(quoting Ginsberg's allegation that NFL officials purposely kept important infor-
mation from players regarding ingredients in StarCaps). "[Adolpho Birch] knew
about Bumetanide and Starcaps. . . . All he cared about was the commercial aspect
of the league. He did not care - and in fact showed a gross disregard - for the
health and safety of players." Id. The Williamses' attorney noted that withholding
this information jeopardized both their health and ability to comply with league
policies. See id. (suggesting Birch exhibited "gross disregard" for players' health
and wellness).
29. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 870 (8th Cir. 2009)
(explaining Ginsberg's use of American Disabilities Act to bolster claim that NFL
policy and testing procedures are "violative of the players' fundamental and guar-
anteed rights."). "Ginsberg notes that three of his clients have 'clinical weight
problems,' two of whom have had to add 'weight clauses into their contracts.' He
also identifies 'this [a]s a further complicating factor since a person who has a
weight condition falls within a protected class' under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act." Id. Considering obesity as a protected class tinder the American Disabili-
ties Act is a matter of discretion, and has been contested by some health
professionals, however this is not conclusive. See Lauren Cox, Doctors Fight Labeling
Obesity a Disability, ABC NEws (Jun. 18, 2009), http://www.abcnews.go.com/
Health/WellnessNews/story?id=786571 I&page=1 (discussing physician opposition
to classification).
30. See Williams, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (quoting Pash on strict liability policy).
Pash explained, "the Policy has always adhered to the 'fundamental principle' of
strict liability that 'puts the burden on players to be responsible and accountable
for what is in their bodies."' Id. See also MatthewJ. Mitten, Judge Extends Preliminary
2012] 209
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that they knew about the league's drug regulations, supplement
hotline, and strict liability policy. 3'
Two months after the drug tests were administered, the NFL
sent letters to the Williamses informing them of their violations of
the league drug policy and suspending them without pay for four
games each, according to NFL protocol. 3 2 Vikings fans became out-
raged as two of their Pro Bowl defensive tackles were benched dur-
ing the NFC playoffs.33 The case attracted national attention
almost immediately.34
The Williamses appealed the suspensions.35 The independent
arbiter who heard the appeal, Jeffrey Pash,3 6 learned that StarCaps
contained bumetanide in mid-November 2008, approximately a
week before the arbitration began.37 Pash upheld the suspensions,
holding the players responsible for violating the Policy.38 He main-
tained that players assume strict liability for taking any drugs or di-
Injunction in NFL Doping Case, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAw SCHOOL FAculTY BLOC
(Dec. 18, 2008), http://aw.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2008/12/18/judge-ex-
tends-preliminary-injunction-in-nfl-doping-case/ (referencing NFL's strict liability
policy on drug use). For a description of NFL strict liability drug policy, see infra
note 84 and accompanying text.
31. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 871 (supporting Williamses' admission of knowl-
edge and awareness of drug policies and NFL resources for information about
supplements). For a further discussion of NFL drug regulations, the supplement
hotline, and strict liability policies, see infra notes 39, 84-86 and accompanying
text.
32. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 870-72 (summarizing NFL's informing Williamses
of punishment for positive test result and reiterating NFL's strict liability policy).
33. See Jensen, supra note 28 (describing Vikings fans' reaction to players'
suspensions).
34. For a further discussion of the national attention paid to Williams case and
commentators' predictions of implications of case, see supra notes 8-11 and infra
notes 255, 281 and accompanying text.
35. See Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v. Nat'l Football League, 654 F.
Supp. 2d 960, 963 (D. Minn. 2009) (explaining appeals process for NFL
suspensions).
36. See id. ("The Commissioner designated Defendant Jeffrey Pash, the NFL's
chief legal officer, to be the Hearing Officer in the appeals.").
37. See id. at 871 (supplying timeframe of arbitration process). Pash learned
that StarCaps contained bumetanide between November 10, 2008 and November
13, 2008; the arbitration hearing was on November 20, 2008. See id. (providing
timeline for relevant events in case).
38. Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 872 (8th Cir. 2009) (sum-
marizing Pash's findings and decision to uphold suspensions). The court stated:
Pash rejected the players' argument in light of: (1) the rule of strict liabil-
ity embodied in the policy, (2) the 20-year history of the application of
the policy, and (3) the 'repeated [ ] warn [ings] that if [players] take sup-
plements, they do so at their own risk," (4) "knowing that a positive test
would result in suspension and would not be excused based on a claim of
unintentional or inadvertent use."
Id.
[Vol. 19: p. 203
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etary supplements and rejected the players' arguments that Dr.
Lombardo was obligated to inform players if he had specific knowl-
edge regarding a banned product.39
On December 3, 2008, the Williamses sought legal redress for
eleven alleged violations of Minnesota law.40 The Williamses then
filed a state court action against the NFL appealing their suspen-
sions.4 Following a temporary restraining order issued by the state
court, the NFL removed the case to the federal court system.42 The
Williamses amended their complaint to include two more counts:
alleged violations of DATWA and CPA, two Minnesota state labor
statutes.43 On December 4, 2008, the NFL Players Association
("NFLPA") filed suit against the NFL and the NFL Management
Council ("NFLMC") under Section 301 of the LMRA, alleging viola-
tions of the league's CBA and public policy."4 The NFL asserted
that federal law preempted these claims; the plaintiffs countered
that the claims were "supplemental to any federal law issues, instead
of being preempted by them."4 5
The United States District Court of Minnesota held that Sec-
tion 301 preempted the Williamses' common law claims, but not
39. See id. (quoting Pash's findings and dismissing idea that Dr. Lombardo is
obligated to disclose knowledge of banned product). The court quoted:
[The players] contend that where specific evidence is available about a
particular product, a specific warning is required, and that failure to ex-
tend such a warning should excuse any violation of the Policy associated
with that product. . . . The Policy does not articulate or impose an obliga-
tion to issue specific warnings about specific products, and nothing in the
record suggests that the bargaining parties have ever contemplated im-
posing such a requirement on Dr. Lombardo.
Id.
40. See id. at 872 n.7 (listing Williams' claims). The eleven counts were: re-
quest for injunctive relief; breach of fiduciary duty by the NFL; aiding and abetting
breaches of fiduciary duty; violation of public policy; fraud and constructive fraud;
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence; intentional infliction of
emotional distress; vicarious liability for torts committed by individual defendants.
See id. (listing causes of action).
41. See id. at 872 (summarizing chronology of legal proceedings). In the in-
terim, on December 4, 2008, the Union filed suit alleging breach of contract and
seeking the reversal of the arbitration holding. See id. (mentioning separate suit
filed by Union on behalf of players).
42. See id. at 872 (providing procedural background of case).
43. See id. (listing Williams' amended complaints). These additional claims
were filed in federal court on January 2, 2009. See id. (supplying date of filing of
amended complaint).
44. See id. (describing NFLPA's claims under section 301).
45. Aaron Shepard, Comment, Football's Stormy Future: Forecasting the Upcoming
National Football League Labor Negotiations, 33 CoLum. J.L. & ARTs 527, 541 (2010).
The NFL and the plaintiffs' contention over whether the state claims were pre-
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their statutory claims under DATWA and CPA.46 The district court
remanded the statutory claims, DATWA and CPA, to Minnesota
state court, noting that they were a "reflection of Minnesota public
policy," thus, Minnesota judges had a more logical and vested inter-
est in the outcome. 47 The Williamses, the NFLPA, and the NFL
appealed the district court decision. 48 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
holding that the NFL's drug testing policy does not supersede Min-
nesota state law, thus finding in favor of the Williamses on the pre-
emption claim.4" The Supreme Court rejected the NFL's writ for
certiorari on November 8, 2010, allowing the case to remain in the
Minnesota state court system.5 11 On April 28, 2011, the Williams liti-
gation concluded when the Minnesota State Supreme Court re-
46. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 873 (limiting scope of preemption doctrine in
context of case and ruling that Williamses' statutory claims were independent of
analysis of CBA). The district court made a number of other holdings that were
unrelated to the preemption issue:
[T]he court concluded that the Union's argument-that the NFL and Dr.
Lombardo violated public policy by failing to disclose that StarCaps con-
tained bumetanide-failed because Dr. Lombardo warned players about
weight-loss supplements in general and testified that had a player asked
him about StarCaps he would have disclosed that it contained bumeta-
nide. The court determined that Dr. Lombardo's decision not to provide
an ingredient-specific warning was within his discretion. The court fur-
ther decided that the NFL had no duty to specifically inform players
when a supplement is found to contain a banned substance. Finally, the
court determined that Pash was not a partial arbitrator and, even if Pash's
involvement could somehow establish bias, the Players and the Union
had waived any such claim. Therefore, the court dismissed the Union's
section 301 breach of contract claim and the Players' common law claims
(which the court had already determined were actually § 301 claims).
Id.
The court must afford the arbiter 'an extraordinary level of deference'
and must confirm the award as long as 'the arbitrator was even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority.' . . . Further, the court may vacate the decisions 'only for the
reasons enumerated in the FAA.'
Nat'l Football League Players Assoc. v. Nat'l Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960,
967 (D. Minn. 2009) (quoting Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.,
381 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2004); Crawford Group, Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F.3d
971, 976 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting stringency with which court analyzes claims of
arbiter bias).
47. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 873 (explaining policy rationale for remanding
case to state court system).
48. See id. (stating parties appealed lower court decision).
49. See id. at 873-86 (analyzing players' statutory and common law claims,
eventually affirming district court holding).
50. See Bill Mears, Supreme Court Stays Out of NFL Drug Violation Dispute, CNN
(Nov. 8, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-08/us/scotus.nfl.drugs_I-play-
ers-for-illegal-drugs-drug-policy-appeals-court?_s=PM:US (reporting Supreme
Court's decision and commenting on rationale for decision); National Football
League v. Williams, SCOTUS BLOC, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/
10
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jected Pat Williams's appeal, thus upholding the players'
suspensions.5' As of September 2011, this case was resolved and the
Williamses served their suspensions at the beginning of the 2011-
2012 Vikings season. 5 2
III. BACKGROUND
A. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreements and
the NFL Drug Policy
The NFL has been hailed as the most powerful organization in
the world, with thirty-two teams in its empire.5 3 Each member team
of the NFL is a separately owned entity; however, all of the teams
operate under the governance of the NFL Constitution and By-
laws .54 Each team is considered an independent employer of its
national-football-league-v-williams/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) [hereinafter
"SCOTUS BI-oG"] (updating status of case).
51. See Christopher Gates, Minnesota Supreme Court Refuses To Hear Pat Williams'
Appeal, SB NATION MINNESOTA (Apr. 28, 2011, 3:56PM), http://minne-
sota.sbnation.com/minnesota-vikings/2011/4/28/2140142/minnesota-supreme-
court-refuses-to-hear-pat-williams-appeal ("With the Minnesota Supreme Court's
refusal to hear the appeal, the accused have no more legal remedies, and will likely
have to face their suspensions . . . .").
52. For updated information on resolution of case, see supra note 270 and
accompanying text.
53. See B-Dub, The NFL Is Now the Most Powerful Organization in the World,
PLAYER PRESS (Apr. 20, 2010), http://playerpress.com/articles/the-nfl-is-now-the-
most-powerful-organization-in-the-world ("The NFL draft draws more viewers an-
nually than the actual games of other sports. And nine of the top then highest-
rated programs in the history of television are Super Bowls."). See NFL Teams, CBS
SPoRTs, http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/teams (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (listing
NFL teams by conference). The thirty-two teams are: Buffalo Bills, Miami Dol-
phins, New England Patriots, New YorkJets, Baltimore Ravens, Cincinnati Bengals,
Cleveland Browns, Pittsburgh Steelers, Houston Texans, Indianapolis Colts, Jack-
sonville Jaguars, Tennessee Titans, Denver Broncos, Kansas City Chiefs, Oakland
Raiders, San Diego Chargers, Dallas Cowboys, New York Giants, Philadelphia Ea-
gles, Washington Redskins, Chicago Bears, Detroit Lions, Green Bay Packers, Min-
nesota Vikings, Atlanta Falcons, Carolina Panthers, New Orleans Saints, Tampa
Bay Buccaneers, Arizona Cardinals, St. Louis Rams, San Francisco 49ers, and Seat-
tle Seahawks. See id. (naming thirty-two NFL member teams).
54. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment at *1,
Williams v. Nat'l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, 2010 WL 1793130 (D.
Minn. 2010) (providing structure of NFL organization); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l
Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2214-15 (2010) (determining that NFL is not sin-
gle entity, but instead collection of thirty-two separately owned entities); see also
Brown v. Nat'l Football League, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Brown
worked not for the NFL, but for the Cleveland Browns Football Company, a Dela-
ware limited partnership and an entirely separate entity which happens to be a
member of the NFL."). See generally Constantine J. Avgiris, Comment, Huddle Up:
Surveying the Playing Field on the Single Entity Status of the National Football League in
Anticipation of American Needle v. NFL, 17 Vai.. SroRTs & ENT. L.J. 529 (2010) (ana-
lyzing single entity status of NFL).
2012] 213
11
Gittleman: Home Field Advantage: Determining the Appropriate Turf for Willia
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
214 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
respective players.55 The thirty-two teams compose the NFLMC,
which negotiates with the NFLPA.56 Additionally, the NFLPA,
which was formed in 1956, represents players in labor disputes.57
Specifically, the NFLPA works to make players' contracts more lu-
crative to offset the competitive nature of the game and players'
susceptibility to career-ending injuries.5 8 The NFL Commissioner
monitors each party's compliance with the negotiated terms.59 The
NFL Commissioner for the 2008-2009 season was Roger Goodell, a
former NFL Chief Operating Officer.60
Issues with drugs in the NFL heightened in the 1970s and
1980s, and in 1982, the first drug testing programs were imple-
mented by individual teams.6' These inaugural policies were aimed
at player "health and safety" and preserving "competitive -integ-
rity."62 These policy rationales remain the backbone of the NFL's
drug policy.63 NFL players are randomly tested for prohibited sub-
stances at predetermined intervals."6 The NFL administers approx-
55. See Hanson, supra note 21, at 339 (explaining process of collective bar-
gaining and structure of employee-employer relationship).
56. See id. (describing relationship among NFL teams and governing
organizations).
57. See About Us, NFL PlAYERS, http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 16, 2011) ("The NFL Players Association ... [r]epresents all players in
matters concerning wages, hours, and working conditions and protects their rights
as professional football players.").
58. See Labor in ATL History, SHMOOP UNIVERSITY, http://www.shmoop.com/
nfl-history/labor.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (providing background on
NFLPA's role in contract drafting).
59. SeeJoshua A. Reece, Note, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner- How
Independent Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL's Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, 45 VAL. U. L. REv. 359, 360 (2010) (explaining
NFL Commissioner's authority to punish players' behavior that deviates from NFL
standards).
60. See Mark Maske, Owners Pick Goodell as NFL Commissioner, WASHINGTON
POST, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/08/08/AR200608081043.html (commenting on Goodell's path to become
Commissioner and other contenders for coveted position).
61. See Lock, supra note 2, at 7-8 (providing history of exacerbation of drug
problem, and NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle's directive that individual teams
institute drug testing programs).
62. See Drew Ruble, Czar Adolpho, BUSINESS TN (Jan. 2008), http://businesstn.
com/content/czar-adolpho (quoting Birch speaking about NFL's instituting drug
policies).
63. For a further discussion of policy rationale for drug policies, see supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
64. See NFL STEROIDS POLIcY (2007), supra note 3, at 34-36 (detailing process
for testing athletes for steroid use). The policy outlines a number of times at
which random testing is administered: pre-employment; annual/preseason; regu-
lar season; postseason; off-season; and reasonable cause testing for players with
prior positive tests or under other circumstances. See id. (stating guidelines for
prohibited substance testing).
[Vol. 19: p. 203
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imately 26,000 random drug tests annually.65 The league
analogizes their testing system to a typical employment setting, not-
ing that individuals who test positive for drugs will face repercus-
sions.66 Further, the NFL has a carefully drafted policy assigning
authorized collectors to take the specimens while abiding by a strict
set of rules regarding collection and anonymity.67 The NFL Policy
also specifies approved facilities to which specimens are sent for
evaluation.68 This extensive number of provisions and careful plan-
ning reflects the NFL's emphasis on maintaining a drug-free league
and upholding the integrity of its testing procedures.69
The Policy specifically lays out the ramifications for a positive
drug test.7 0 The NFL's Policy assigns exclusive authority to an advi-
sor to make decisions regarding steroid use or possession by play-
ers.7' The Policy outlines, "[p]layers with a confirmed positive test
result will be subject to discipline by the Commissioner. . . . The
65. See Alex Marvez, NFL Drug Testing Could See Big Change, FOX SIors ON
MSN (May 24, 2011, 5:14 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/NFL-driig-
testing-program-coild-use-outside-company-WADA-052411 (reporting NFL testing
frequency). The NFL conducts approximately 14,000 tests for performance-en-
hancing drugs, and 12,000 for recreational drugs; approximately 6,000 tests are
conducted during the off-season. See id. (citing test statistics). Dr. Birch suggests
that the NFL administers more drug tests than any other organization. See id. (con-
sidering possible increase if NFL delegates testing to outside organization). How-
ever, players are given notice the night before the administration of a test, which
lessens the effectiveness of such testing procedures. See Michael S. Schmidt, On
Twitter, a Key Flaw in NFL. Drug Tests, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010, at SPI,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/sports/football/22testing.html
(discussing lack of element of surprise of drug tests and questioning drug testing
procedure).
66. See NFL STEROIDS PoiicY (2007), supra note 3, at 34 ("As is the case in the
employment setting, players testing positive in a pre-employment setting will be
subjected to medical evaluation and clinical monitoring as set forth in Sections 3A,
4C, and 12, and to the disciplinary steps outlined in Section 6.").
67. See id. at 48 (explaining strict testing procedure and guidelines for sample
collection and evaluation).
68. See id. at 36 (listing accredited facilities for anti-doping testing by ISO and
World Anti-Doping Association).
69. See id. at 33-34 (outlining introductory policy reasons for implementing
drug testing policies).
70. See generally id. (specifying punishments for positive drug results).
71. See id. at 34 (assigning authority for implementing policy to advisor). This
advisor's specific title is "NFL Advisor on Anabolic Steroids and Related Sub-
stances." Id. The advisor's position grants:
sole discretion to make determinations regarding steroid-related matters,
including medical evaluations and testing . . . consultation with players
and team physicians; oversee[ing] the development of educational mater-
ials; [participating] in research on steroids; confer[ring] with the Con-
sulting Toxicologist; and serv[ing] on the League's Advisory Committee
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first time a player violates the Policy by testing positive [for a
banned substance] . . . he will be suspended without pay for a mini-
mum of four regular and/or postseason games."72 During the 2008
season, Dr. John Lombardo acted as independent administrator of
the Policy.73 Players may petition the Commissioner or a person to
whom he designates authority; however, the arbiter's decision is fi-
nal and binding.74
Each NFL team is governed by the CBA; the agreement under
which the StarCaps litigation arose was valid through March 2011.75
The CBA stipulates that member teams (clubs) employ individual
NFL players, not the NFL. 76 Players' contracts are between the
players and the member club.77 The CBA affords individual teams
the sole authority to "hire, fire, negotiate, and sign contracts with
players, cut players, and provide special bonuses for players;" how-
ever, the NFL retains the right to review and approve every NFL
contract for players.78 Thus, it would be difficult for the players to
72. Id. at 38.
73. Id. at 47 (identifying Lombardo's role as administrator); MAX Sports
Medicine - John A. Lombardo, MD, MAX SPORTS MEDICINE, http://www.maxsport-
scenter.com/Meet-Our-Staff/John-A-Lombardo,-MD.aspx (last visited Sept. 16,
2011) (identifying Dr. Lombardo as advisor to NFL for performance-enhancing
drugs and as Independent Administrator of NFL Policy for Anabolic-Androgenic
Steroids and Related Substances).
74. See NFL STEROIDS POICY (2007), supra note 3, at 40 (describing discipli-
nary appeals process); Pacman's 1-Year Suspension Upheld, ABC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/sports/story?id=3832139&page=1 (exemplifying Commis-
sioner Goodell's authority to accept or reject players' appeals).
75. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Explained, SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED (Jan.
20, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/nfl/01/20/
cba.qa/index.html (posing questions and answers about current NFL CBA). After
the 2006-2012 CBA expired, there was a four-month lockout over labor issues. See
Players, Owners Sign Deal to End NFL Lockout, CNN (July 25, 2011,.13:24 GMT),
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/SPORT/07/25/nfl.deal/index.htmi (reporting on
end of four-month lockout). The NFL lockout ended on July 25, 2011 with the
signing of a new, ten-year collective bargaining agreement. See id. (summarizing
term of new CBA).
76. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment at *1,
Williams v. Nat'l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, 2010 WL 1793130 (D.
Minn. 2010) (discussing NFL CBA and specific language regarding employment).
For a further discussion of the employee-employer relationship between the NFL
and NFL players, see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
77. See CBA, Preamble, NFL, 3 (2006) http://static.nfl.com/static/content/
public/image/cba/nfl-cba-2006-2012.pdf [hereinafter referred to as "CBA
(2006)"] (providing member clubs of NFL, not NFL itself, employs players). This
article is primarily based on the content of the 2006 NFL CBA; at the time of
writing, the 2011 CBA negotiations were not complete. For a further discussion of
the employee-employer relationship, see supra notes 54-55, 76-78 and accompany-
ing text.
78. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment at *3,
*18, Williams v. Nat'l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, 2010 WL 1793130 (D.
14
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argue that the CBA itself is unconscionable, as players were inte-
grally involved in its creation.79
The Policy lists the names of prohibited substances, divided
into categories of anabolic/androgenic steroids, masking agents,
and certain stimulants.80 Bumenatide is listed under the "masking
agent" category; the Policy defines masking agents as "[for exam-
ple] diuretics or water pills" used for weight loss.8' The Policy
warns players about use of diuretics and dietary supplements, a cat-
egory into which StarCaps logically fits. 8 2 Specifically, the Policy
reads, "a positive test result will not be excused because it results
from the use of a dietary supplement, rather than from intentional
use of a Prohibited Substance."83 Further, there is a caveat that ad-
dresses dietary supplements, warning that these supplements are
not subject to government regulation and may contain products
that are not explicitly listed in the ingredients; thus, players accept
responsibility for taking these products and are strongly dissuaded
from doing so.8 4 An NFL Dietary Supplement Hotline is also pro-
vided as a resource to players.8 5 This hotline provides confidential
Minn. 2010) (describing rights of team owners while reserving final oversight to
NFL).
79. See Kevin Seifert, Here Come the Lauyers, ESPN (Dec. 2, 2008, 10:37 PM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/tag/-/name/peter-ginsberg (discussing par-
ties privy to CBA drafting). "After all, the NFL and its Players Association have
collectively-bargained the steroids policy. Ginsberg would have to argue that the
policy was wrongly administered. Suggesting that the policy itself is unfair or ille-
gal might not help because the players participated in its development." Id.
80. See NFL STEROIDS POLICY (2007), supra note 3, at 43-46 (listing banned
substances by category). Each substance is listed by generic name and examples of
some brand names. See id. (listing substances and some products that include
substance).
81. See id. at 40 (listing masking agents).
82. For a further discussion of StarCaps in NFL context, see supra notes 23-24
and accompanying text.
83. NFL STEROIDS POLICY (2007), supra note 3, at 40.
84. See NFL STEROIDS POiicy (2007), supra note 3, at 52 (stating that players
who take these dietary supplements do so "at [their] own risk"). The appendix
further states, "several players have been suspended even though their positive test
result may have been due to the use of a supplement, [and] . . . if you test positive
or otherwise violate the Policy, you will be suspended ... [as y]ou and you alone
are responsible for what goes into your body." Id. Appendix G, a memorandum
from Dr. Lombardo, explains, "[i]f you take a supplement that contains a sub-
stance that violates the policy it will subject you to discipline. More importantly,
you run the risk of harmful health effects associated with their use." Id. at 53.
85. See Michael O'Keefe, NFL Sets Up Supplement Hotline Joins NFLPA in Info
Drive, NY DAllY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2001, 2:22 AM) http://www.nydailynews.com/
archives/sports/2001/08/ 10/2001-08-10_nflsets-up supplement-hotli.html
(describing resources and information provided by hotline).
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product information; however, use of the Hotline does not absolve
players from responsibility for their own actions.8'
B. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
The LMRA, or Taft-Hartley Act, was an update of the 1935
Wagner Act (part of the New Deal).87 The Wagner Act governed
employment relations affecting interstate commerce and stimu-
lated the development of labor unions.88 The Wagner Act also cre-
ated the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to oversee union
and employee relations.89 In 1947, Congress replaced the Wagner
Act with the Taft-Hartley Act, which added a number of contested
provisions. t o Section 301 reads, "[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing em-
ployees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties . . . ."9
In accordance with the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
United States Constitution, when federal and state laws are in con-
flict, federal laws govern.9 2 The rationale behind this rule is to en-
courage uniform application of collective bargaining agreements.9 3
86. Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing defendants' brief) (providing information about Hotline, anonymity, and
other drug prevention and reporting resources); see O'Keefe, supra note 85 (re-
porting creation of hotline).
87. See Steven Wagner, How Did the Taft-Hartley Act Come About?, GEORGE MA-
SON UNivERsriv's HisToRY NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 14, 2002), http://hnn.us/articles/
1036.html (summarizing history of Taft-Hartley Act).
88. See id. (explaining history of labor unions and collectively bargained labor
agreements in United States).
89. See id. (summarizing formation of NLRB).
90. See id. ("The Taft-Hartley Act retained the features of the earlier Wagner
Act but added to it in ways widely interpreted as anti-labor. Labor leaders dubbed
it a 'slave labor' bill and twenty-eight Democratic members of Congress declared it
a 'new guarantee of industrial slavery."').
91. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The provision reads in full:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as de-
fined in this chapter, or between any such labor organization, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without re-
gard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
92. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (describing preemption theory governing situ-
ations in which federal and state law claims conflict); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat. 1) (1824) (establishing and applying Supremacy Clause).
93. See Mark L. Adams, Struggling Through the Thicket: Section 301 and the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, 15 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 106, 118 (1994) (commenting
16
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Section 301 of the LMRA preempts almost all state causes of action
concerning collective bargaining agreements. 94
Section 301, however, generally does not preempt state laws
that govern conduct falling outside a collective bargaining or other
labor agreement.9 5 Gabriel A. Feldman, a leading sports law ex-
pert, summarized, "if the state law creates a right separate and apart
from the rights created by the collective bargaining agreement, the
state law claim will not be preempted, even if the analysis of the
state law claim would overlap with the analysis of a claim brought
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement."-6 The ex-
ception covers claims that are "tangentially" related to collective
bargaining agreements. 97 If it were not for this exception, all col-
lective bargaining agreements would automatically become federal
law.9 " A noteworthy and relevant consideration is how closely tied
the state law at issue is to the CBA.99 The most widely used stan-
on "straightforward logic supporting the need for a uniform federal law regarding
labor contracts" and subsequent confusion about scope of application).
94. SeeWilliams v. Nat'1 Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2009)
(referencing section 301 and introducing its application); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (out-
lining use of section 301 for "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization."). See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
213, 220 (1985) (analyzing scope of preemption clause); Oberkramer v. IBEW-
NECA Serv. Ctr., Inc., 151 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 1998) (describing preemption
clause of National Labor Relations Act and narrowing scope of use). State law
claims that are "substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms or provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement or are 'inextricably intertwined' with
consideration of the terms or provisions of a collective bargaining agreement are
also preempted by § 301." Id.
95. See Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 213 ("State-law rights and obligations
that do not exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be
waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are preempted by those
agreements.").
96. The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports'Anti-Doping Programs at a Legal Crossroads?
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the HR Comm. on Energy
& Commerce, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Gabriel A. Feldman, Associate
Professor of Law and Director of Tulane Sports Law Program, Tulane University
School of Law), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
Press 111/20091103/feldman testimony.pdf [herein referred to as "Feldman"].
97. See Hanson, supra note 21, at 346 (qualifying scope of preemption
doctrine).
98. See id. (discussing implications of application of section 301 to collective
bargaining agreements).
99. See Shepard, supra note 45, at 542 (summarizing consideration of relation-
ship between DATWA and CBA). The Eighth Circuit analyzed whether the
DATWA "was intrinsically tied to the CBA .... The key inquiry was whether the
claim was based on a right set forth in the agreement, or otherwise could not go
forward without a significant analysis of the relevant CBA section." Id.
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dard involves determining whether the claim is "inextricably inter-
twined" with the terms of the CBA. 00
An important point emphasized in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck,"o' a leading case in the area of preemption, is that section
301 does not allow parties to a collective bargaining agreement to
rewrite state law. 0 2 In that case, the plaintiff was a member of a
labor union through his employer, Allis-Chalmers Corporation.' 03
He sued his insurance carrier for breach of fiduciary duty and un-
fair labor practices when they withheld disability payments follow-
ing a non-occupational injury to the plaintiffs back. 04 In its
analysis, the Court explained state laws that "proscribe conduct, or
establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract"
are not preempted." 5 The Eighth Circuit has largely followed the
rationale of the Allis-Chalmers Court. 0 6 In Meyer v. Schnucks Markets,
Inc.,"o7 the Eighth Circuit proposed a test for determining whether
claims are preempted: if the state law claim can be resolved without
consulting the CBA, section 301 will not preempt the claim."s An-
100. See e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985) (using
terminology "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract."); Adams, supra note 93, at 120 (directing focus to whether claim is "inex-
tricably intertwined" and quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp).
101. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
102. See id. at 211 ("Were state laws allowed to determine the meaning in-
tended by the parties in adopting a particular contract phrase or term, all the evils
addressed in Lucas Flour would recur. The parties would be uncertain as to what
they were binding themselves to when they agreed to create a right to collect bene-
fits under certain circumstances. As a result, it would be more difficult to reach
agreement, and disputes as to the nature of the agreement would proliferate.");
Hanson, supra note 21, at 330 (discussing, generally, when state claims are pre-
empted by section 301).
103. See Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 207 (describing basis for Mr. Lueck's
claim). Mr. Lueck had suffered a debilitating back injury and his insurance com-
pany repeatedly withheld disability payments. See id. at 205 (reciting facts of case).
104. See id. (explaining plaintiffs injury and scope of coverage of plan). The
plaintiff argued that Aetna Life & Casualty Company, the union's insurance car-
rier, "intentionally, contemptuously, and repeatedly failed to make disability pay-
ments under the negotiated disability plan, without a reasonable basis for
withholding the payments." Id. at 206.
105. See id. at 212 (creating court precedent for limiting application of section
301).
106. See Hanson, supra note 21, at 348 (discussing Eighth Circuit interpreta-
tion of section 301 and use of Supreme Court precedent to guide circuit court
decisions).
107. 163 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 1998).
108. See id. at 1050 (setting forth two factors: whether "state-law claim itself is
based on [a collective bargaining agreement] . . . or dependent upon analysis of
[the agreement]."). "For there to be complete preemption, we believe that the
claim must require the interpretation of some specific provision of a CBA; it is not
enough that the events in question took place in the workplace or that a CBA
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other important case, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 09 reit-
erated the "depends upon" standard for preemption, and charged:
[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the
meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the appli-
cation of state law (which might lead to inconsistent re-
sults since there could be as many state-law principles as
there are States) is preempted and federal labor-law prin-
ciples-necessarily uniform through the Nation-must be
employed to resolve the dispute. 0
Preemption in the context of labor law is judge-made; thus,
this is an area in which courts have relative flexibility."' As the
outcomes of preemption cases suggest, the language of section 301
is confusing and vulnerable to disparate application.' 12 Even cases
aimed at clarifying preemption have added to the disorder." 3 One
commentator opined that preemption litigation, in particular sec-
tion 301 claims, "has been one of the most confused areas of fed-
eral court litigation."' 14 Additionally, while "inextricably
intertwined" is perhaps the most common language, courts have
used a number of other phrases to suggest the requisite level of
connection between a state law and a CBA provision to justify pre-
creates rights and duties similar or identical to those on which the state-law claim is
based." Id. at 1051.
109. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
110. Id. at 405-06.
111. See The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports' Anti-Doping Programs at a Legal Cross-
roads?: Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H.R. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 1, 11 (2009) (testimony of Jeffrey Standen,
Professor of Law, Willamette University) http://democrats.energycommerce.
house.gov/Press_111/2009/1103?standentestimony.pdf (explaining possible mo-
tivation for Supreme Court to hear case due to impact and nature of preemption
doctrine).
112. See e.g. Adams, supra note 93, at 121-22 (comparing two preemption
cases, noting holdings were "ambiguous" and "not easily reconciled"); Laura W.
Stein, Preserving Unionized Employees' Individual Employment Rights: An Argument
Against Section 301 Preemption, 17 BERKELEYJ. EMI'. & LAB. L. 1, 1 (1996) (reflecting
on preemption precedent and its impact). "Just within the past decade the Su-
preme Court has used several tests to determine whether a state law should be
preempted." Id. The author suggests, "the problem with the current doctrine of
section 301 preemption goes beyond the confusion stirred in the lower courts by
erratic Supreme Court holdings." Id.
113. See Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need for a New Approach to Federal Pre-
emption of Union Members State Law Claims, 99 YALE L. J. 209, 209 (1989) (positing
Lingle "attempted to clarify section 301's preemptive scope, but the decision has
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emption. 1 5 This issue is compounded by the variety of organiza-
tions and unions that use CBAs; each of these unions has unique
needs and goals they seek to accomplish under their agreements.11 6
C. Minnesota State Laws: The Drug and Alcohol Testing in the
Workplace Act and Consumable Product Act
The Williamses alleged that the NFL violated both DATWA
and CPA in issuing the players' suspensions resulting from their use
of StarCaps.' '7
The DATWA was enacted in 1987 and provides a framework
for drug testing in the workplace in Minnesota.' 18 Minnesota's pro-
cedures are among the most thorough in the nation and provide a
number of safeguards for both employees and employers."" A
press release on the policy notes that Minnesota's policy is strict and
warns that national companies with employees in Minnesota are
particularly susceptible to violating the drug testing rules due to
their specificity. 12
115. See e.g. Trs. of Twin Cities Bricklayers Fringe Benefit v. Superior Water-
proofing, 450 F.3d 324, 330 (8th Cir. 2006) ("An otherwise independent claim will
not be preempted if the CBA need only be consulted during its adjudication.");
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988) (providing "if
the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, the application of state law ... is pre-empted . . . .").
116. For a discussion of various unions that were involved in section 301 pre-
emption litigation, see supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text. Union mem-
bership spans both the public and private sectors, as well as a number of
professional disciplines including: teaching; law enforcement; transportation; con-
struction; and professional athletics. See Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.bis.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (re-
leasing statistics about union membership rates and demographics); Sports Unions +
Leagues -Labor Relations and the Sports Industry, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES (Oct.
4, 2011), http://ibguides.rutgers.edu/content.php?pid=148775&sid=1276918
(providing links for professional sports league unions).
117. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 872 (8th Cir. 2009)
(describing procedural history of case). The plaintiffs added claims of DATWA
and CPA violations in their First Amended Complaint, filed with the Fourth Circuit
District Court on January 2, 2009. See id. (discussing claims added in amended
complaint).
118. See Drug & Alcohol Testing Background, MINNESOTA CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, http://mnchamber.com/priorities/drugalcohol-bkgd.pdf (explaining pas-
sage of Minnesota workplace drug and alcohol policies); see Dale L. Deitchler,
Minnesota Law Applies to Union-Negotiated Drug Testing Policies, Says Eighth Circuit, LIr-
TLER MENDELSON P.C. (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.littler.coin/PressPublications/
Lists/ASAPs/DispASAPs.aspx?List=edb4a871%2D9e73%2D4eae%2Dbj8l%D3d04
5b6ede6d&ID=1431 (providing background of DAWTA in relation to Williams
case).
119. See Drug & Alcohol Testing Background, supra note 118 (listing clauses of
current state drug and alcohol policy).
120. See V. John Ella, What Do They Have in Mind? Minnesota's Drug-Testing Law
Turns 20, BENCH & BAR OF MINNESOTA Vol. 64, No. 8 (2010), available at http://
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The DATWA laws carefully define an employer as "any person
or entity located or doing business in this state and having one or
more employees . 1.. "121 The statute stipulates a number of accept-
able testing procedures and circumstances, including job applicant
testing, random testing, and reasonable suspicion testing.'2 2 Specif-
ically, DATWA states that employers cannot dismiss first-time of-
fenders; dismissal is only justified following a failure to participate
in mandatory treatment or counseling at the employee's own ex-
pense.123 Colloquially referred to as the "One Free Strike" rule,
DATWA allows employees one "strike" before their employer may
legally dismiss them.12 4 Subdivision two of DATWA notes that the
Act applies to all CBAs after 1987, the year in which the Act was
passed.' 2 5 However, employers are permitted to adopt a more strin-
gent drug and alcohol policy, provided it does not conflict with the
minimum standards of DATWA.126
Under CPA, lawful consumable products are those "whose use
or enjoyment is lawful and which are consumed during use or en-
joyment . . . ."127 The examples provided in the statute include
food, non-alcoholic beverages, and tobacco.'"2 The CPA permits
employers to:
[R]estrict the use of lawful consumable products by em-
ployees during non-working hours if the restriction relates
to a bona fide occupational requirement, is necessary to
avoid a conflict or an apparent conflict of interest with any
www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2007/septO7/drug-testing.htm ("Minnesota's
DATWA is one of the strictest, most complicated, and employee-friendly drug-test-
ing laws in the country.").
121. Minn. Stat. § 181.950 subdiv. 7 (2010).
122. See Anita Neumann, Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing, MINNESOTA
HousF OF REPRESENTATIVES (June 2010), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/
pubs/dgaltest.pdf (identifying circumstances under which employers can test em-
ployees for drug or alcohol use or abuse).
123. See id. (outlining ramifications for positive drug test result).
124. See Don Erickson, Drug and Alcohol Testing: Crafting a Policy for Your Busi-
ness, BUSINESS NORTH (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.businessnorth.com/viewar-
ticle.asp?articleid=1793 (commenting on leniency of Minnesota policy).
125. See § 181.955 subdiv. 2 (describing scope of application of rule).
126. See id. subdiv.1 (explaining employers' rights to adopt more stringent
regulations); see Williams v. Nat'1 Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 875 (8th Cir.
2009) (quoting § 181.955, "DATWA 'shall not be construed to limit the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement from bargaining and agreeing with respect to a
drug or alcohol testing policy that meets or exceeds, and does not otherwise con-
flict with, the minimum standards and requirements for employee protection"').
127. § 181.938, subdiv. 2 (2010).
128. See id. (listing permissible products under Consumable Products Act).
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of the employee's job responsibilities, or is part of a chem-
ical dependency or treatment program.12 9
The CPA is often cited as a statute that protects employees from
sanctions resulting from alcohol or tobacco consumption occurring
off-premises during nonworking hours. 30
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
This case consolidated a number of appeals filed by interested
parties.' 3' The NFL, Dr. John Lombardo, and Adolpho Birch ap-
pealed from the district court's holding in favor of the Wil-
liamses. ' 2 Kevin and Pat Williams cross-appealed, arguing that
their state law claims were not preempted by section 301..'1 The
NFLPA appealed the district court's confirmation of arbitration
awards, which upheld the Williamses' suspensions.'
As this was a high-profile case, involving public figures and one
of the nation's most revered organizations, the district court was
careful to devote attention to the details of the Policy, including
supplemental memoranda and appendices.13 5 The court first con-
sidered the DATWA claim, which the NFL argued was preempted
for a number of procedural and policy reasons. 3 6 The players'
129. Workplace Issues, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ANI) EcONOMIc
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.positivelyminnesota.com/Business/PDFs/Employ-
ersGuide-toEmploymentLaw Issues-in-Minnesota/06_WorkplaceIssues.pdf
(last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
130. See Michael Wilhelm, Minnesota's Lawful Consumable Products Statute, MIN-
NESOTA EMPLOYER (Sept. 14, 2011), http://minnesotaemployer.com/2011/09/14/
minnesota's-lawful-consumable-products-statute/ (warning employers about pro-
tective provisions of statute).
131. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing procedural pos-
ture of case, particularly efforts to consolidate claims).
132. See id. (discussing parties to appeal and rationale for appealing).
133. See id. (clarifying Williamses' role in appeals and central argument).
134. See id. (reflecting on NFLPA's appeal).
135. See High Profile Cases, MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.
mncourts.gov/district/4/?page=1829 (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (reporting recent
orders in state court, labeling Williams case "high profile"); Williams v. Nat'l Foot-
ball League, 582 F.3d 863, 868-69 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Policy and highlighting
NFL's emphasis on players' responsibility for taking dietary supplements at their
own risk).
136. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 873 ("The NFL asserts that the DATWA claim is
preempted because: (1) the claim turns on analysis of the Policy in order to deter-
mine whether it 'meets or exceeds' DATWA's requirements, (2) the claim requires
interpretation of the Policy in order to determine whether the NFL qualifies as an
employer under DATWA such that the statute's protections extend to the Players,
and (3) uniform interpretation of the CBA/Policy is necessary to preserve the in-
tegrity of the NFL's business as a national organization.").
[Vol. 19: p. 203
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/6
HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE
claim was broad, alleging that the NFL violated their rights by fail-
ing to comply with DATWA. 7 The NFL countered that, while
their policy did deviate from the DATWA model, any discrepancies
were "negligible" and did not change the fact that the Williamses
tested positive for a banned substance.'13  Counsel for the NFL fur-
ther explained that their policy met the requirements of DATWA,
since the CBA afforded players the same, if not more, protection
than DATWA under the Act's first subdivision.'39 The court re-
jected this rationale, explaining that being bound to a CBA does
not preclude an individual from receiving protection under
DATWA.140 Thus, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claim did
not necessitate an examination of the Policy, but instead a fact anal-
ysis comparing the Policy with the requirements under DATWA.' 41
This latter approach, a fact analysis, would not require preemption
under section 301. 142 The court reiterated that the standard for
preemption is consultation of the CBA or Policy; instead, this case
involved a purely factual evaluation without consultation of these
documents.143
Further, the NFL argued that the court needed to evaluate the
CBA to determine whether an employer-employee relationship ex-
isted; DATWA is an employment statute, so the court needed to
determine whether the NFL "qualifie[d] as an employer" under the
statute.14 4 The court focused on the "depends upon" language in
Lingle in its analysis.14 5 The court also referenced Trustees, differen-
tiating between interpreting a CBA and consulting a CBA.14 6 Addi-
137. See id. at 875 (discussing cause of action under DATWA state claim).
138. See id. ("[T]he NFL concedes that its steroid testing procedures do not
comply with the letter of Minnesota law, but argues that the differences are negligi-
ble and do not require the Court to invalidate the Williamses' positive tests for
bumetanide.").
139. See id. (explaining NFL's policy and protections for players).
140. See id. (dismissing NFL's rationale for depriving Williamses of DAWTA
claim).
141. See id. at 875-76 (clarifying court's opinion of appropriate analysis of
DATWA and policy).
142. See id. at 875-78 (ruling on section 301 analysis).
143. See id. at 876 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 261,
266 (1994)) (supporting notion that factual examination of NFL drug testing poli-
cies did not require interpretation of CBA).
144. See id. at 876-77 (describing NFL's employer-employee claim).
145. See id. at 876 (evaluating NFL's second claim); see also Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988) (detailing preemption occurs
when "resolution ... depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. ").
146. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 876-77 (quoting Trustees to support idea that
"interpreting" CBA has specific meaning); see Trs. of Twin Cities Bricklayers Fringe
Benefit v. Superior Waterproofing, 450 F.3d 324, 330 (8th Cir. 2006) ["Trustees"]
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tionally, it examined the employee-employer relationship between
players and the NFL, finding that the CBA defines member clubs of
the NFL to be the employers of players, but the NFL itself was not
considered the players' employer; the Court determined that these
"references" to employment in the NFL CBA required only consul-
tation. 147 Upon this analysis, the court concluded that resolution of
the players' claims did not require interpretation of the CBA, but
rather "consultation" - consultation would not necessitate preemp-
tion of a state law claim.148 In addition, the court found that indi-
vidual players' contracts were separate from the league CBA.' 49
Lastly, the court rejected the NFL's policy-driven argument
that creating different state-by-state standards for the application of
a national policy would nullify the effect of uniform enforce-
ment.15 1 The court interpreted Allis-Chalmers Corp. and Cramer, two
preemption cases, concluding that national employers' and unions'
desire to maintain uniformity in their policies does not outweigh
States' rights to enforce their state labor laws.1 5' The court dis-
missed the uniformity argument, ignoring policy implications for
creating different drug and alcohol leniency among and between
states.' 5 2 Despite the NFL's three arguments expounded upon
(providing language for distinguishing between interpretation and consultation of
CBA).
147. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877 (quoting portions of CBA that define em-
ployment relationship).
148. See id. at 876-77 (referencing preemption definitions in Trustees and
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) and concluding that interpretation was
not necessary).
149. See id. at 877 (alluding to difference between contracts and CBA);
Gabriel A. Feldman, NFL Labor Negotiations: Are We Headed for the Doomsday Scenario,
HUFFINTON POST (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-a-feld-
man/nfl-lockout b824910.html (explaining that, unlike in most other employ-
ment situations, NFL players can sign contracts that extend beyond CBA).
150. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877 (dismissing NFL argument that "denying
preemption and subjecting the Policy to divergent state regulations would render
the uniform enforcement of its drug testing policy, on which it relies as a national
organization for the integrity of its business, nearly impossible").
151. See id. at 877-78 (comparing conflicting interests of uniformity and en-
forcement of state labor laws); see generally Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 221 (1985) (holding when "resolution of a state-law claim is substantially de-
pendent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a
labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a section 301 claim . . . or
dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law" and reversing Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision).; Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 697
(9th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiffs state law claims independent of CBA, thus not
preempted).
152. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 878 (providing minimal rationale for rejecting
NFL's national uniformity argument based on idea that CBAs cannot "contract for
what is illegal under state law").
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herein, the court held that section 301 did not preempt the
DATWA claim.15 3
The court subsequently moved to the CPA claim. The NFL ar-
gued that the CPA claim required preemption because the CBA
and Policy were vital aspects of the CPA analysis.15 4 However, the
court reasoned that the NFL's bona-fide requirement exception
claim and conflict-of-interest exception claim were irrelevant to a
section 301 evaluation.' 5" The NFL attempted to preempt the CPA
claim by emphasizing the "off the premises" and "during nonwork-
ing hours" language; however, the court's examination of the CBA
and Policy did not find this language in either document.'5 6 The
court rejected the NFL's allusion to league documents, noting that
the party requesting preemption has the burden of persuasion.'5 7
The Williams Court disagreed with the NFL, deeming preemption
unnecessary, explaining that the "bona fide occupational require-
ment" clause was merely a defense to liability and finding the de-
fenses insufficient to trigger preemption.158 Finally, the court
considered the NFL's claim that players waive their CPA rights be-
cause the Players' Union agreed to the Policy.' 5 Here, the court
dismissed the NFL's arguments due to a lack of supporting case law
and quotations taken out of context.16 0
153. See id. at 878 (holding DATWA not preempted and describing rationale).
154. See id. (summarizing NFL's claim that CPA subject to preemption).
155. See id. at 878-79 (dismissing NFL claim, noting that NFL's defenses were
irrelevant to section 301 analysis and it would be inappropriate to subject CPA
claim to section 301 preemption).
156. See id. at 879-80 (reviewing CBA and Policy, finding that neither includes
referenced language, thus rendering it unnecessary to consult these documents to
resolve CPA issue).
157. See id. at 880 (noting NFL was vague about which document that court
would need to consult in order to evaluate CPA claim).
158. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 6 (describing Court's dismissal of "relates
to a bona fide occupational requirement" language to justify preemption and con-
sultation of CBA). "Raising a defense under federal law is not among the grounds
for removal." Richard S. Meyer & Harris N. Cogan, It's Federally Preempted - Let's
Remove l!, NEw YORK LAw JOURNAL (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.blan-
krome.com/index.cfm?contentlD=37&itemlD=1229. The court also said that the
Policy's rule on diuretics was an occupational requirement because it acted as a
defense to liability, and thus did not require preemption. See 2009 Annual Survey:
Recent Developments in Sports Law, 20 MARQ. SPoRTs L. REV. 497, 618 (2009) (discuss-
ing Williams case, among others, and explaining court's rationale for dismissing
CPA preemption claim).
159. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 880 (summarizing NFL's final argument under
CPA).
160. See id. (comparing NFL's use of quotations from cases to contextual lan-
guage of same quotations).
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The final preemption-related argument the court considered
was the players' common law claims.' 6' The players charged that
these alleged violations were independent of analysis of the CBA or
the Policy, and thus should not be preempted by section 301.162
Borrowing the Third Circuit's test in Bogan v. General Motors
Corp.,'16 the court considered whether it would be permissible to
preempt the alleged state-law tort claims.164 The players alleged
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and gross negligence claims,
accusing the NFL of withholding information about StarCaps' in-
gredients.165 Further, they argued that this duty of disclosure
stemmed from their state law duty as fiduciaries. 166 The Court
found the evaluation of these claims inseparable from an examina-
tion of the Policy, thus the claims were preempted.' 6 7 Similarly, the
Court ruled that the players' fraud, constructive fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
vicarious liability claims were preempted.168 Determining whether
the players were adequately informed and whether their reliance
was reasonable requires a court to evaluate the clarity or ambiguity
of the governing agreement.16" The court pointed to provisions of
the Policy that specifically addressed masking agents and supple-
161. See id. at 880-81 (introducing final argument for consideration). These
claims included breach of fiduciary duty; aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty; violations of public policy; fraud; constructive fraud; negligent misrepresen-
tation; negligence; gross negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and vicarious liability. See id. (listing causes of action).
162. See id. at 881 (describing players' argument that state law claims do not
originate from Policy).
163. Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2007).
164. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 881 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 220 (1985)) ("[E]xamining whether the tort claims: (1) are premised on
duties created by the relevant CBA such that they are 'based on' the agreement, or
(2) require interpretation of the CBA such that they are 'dependent upon an anal-
ysis' of the agreement.").
165. See id. (referencing plaintiffs cross-complaints alleging that NFL officials
had knowledge that StarCaps contained bumetanide, and failed to disclose this
information to players).
166. See id. (recapping players' allegations of breach of fiduciary duty).
167. See id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 221 (1985))
(noting claims "relating to what parties to a labor argument agreed ... must be
resolved by reference to uniform federal law.").
168. See id. at 881-83 (recognizing that players' claims were preempted be-
cause court could not resolve issues without consulting CBA or Policy).
169. See id. at 881-82 (finding plaintiffs' claims of misrepresentation insepara-
ble from evaluation of CBA and Policy); Trs. of Twin City Bricklayers Benefit
Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, 450 F.3d at 326-31 (describing process by which
reliance is proven and necessity to consult and interpret CBA to decide case).
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ments that would be integral to a misrepresentation evaluation. 7 e
The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was contin-
gent upon the Policy's guidelines on employee-employer relation-
ships and mandatory disclosures. 71
The Players' Union sought to vacate the arbitrator's decision
affirming the NFL's suspension of the players who violated the Pol-
icy, a claim the court warned would be difficult considering the def-
erence afforded arbitration awards.172 The Union first claimed that
Dr. Birch had inappropriately persuaded Dr. Lombardo to refer the
players for discipline after they tested positive for bumetanide.' 73
Dr. Lombardo admitted that he would not have referred the players
for discipline but for Birch's instruction; the court recognized this
as an issue with the enforcement of the Policy guidelines, not the
arbitrator's ruling. 7 4 Information about Birch's instruction was
not disclosed until discovery proceedings in the earlier stages of this
case.' 75 Thus, the court ruled that the arbitrator did not know
about Birch's instruction to Dr. Lombardo, and therefore did not
ignore Policy guidelines when issuing his ruling.17" The court also
rejected the Union's claim that the arbitration awards violated pub-
lic policy, alleging that both the NFL's and Dr. Lombardo's failures
to disclose that StarCaps contained bumetanide violated the fiduci-
ary duty owed to players, due to a lack of supporting authority.'7 7
170. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 882 (pointing out evaluation of players' misrep-
resentation claims requires examination of section eight and Appendix G of
Policy).
171. See id. (noting that players' claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress are inseparable from interpretation of Policy, thus requiring preemption).
172. See id. at 883 (describing narrow standards for which arbitration awards
can be vacated). Arbitration awards can be vacated under the Federal Arbitration
Act for reasons including, but not limited to, corruption, fraud, evident partiality,
and misconduct. See Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2003)
(citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)) (discussing relevance of arbitration awards and reasons
for vacating such awards).
173. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 883 (detailing Union's claim of undue
influence).
174. See id. at 883-84 (summarizing process by which Birch influenced Dr.
Lombardo, resulting in disciplinary action against players).
175. See id. at 884 (noting Union did not learn of Birch's inappropriate action
until discovery phase of case, impacting its relevance).
176. See id. ("[I]t is clear that the arbitrator did not 'ignore' the provisions of
either the 2006 or 2008 Policies when he issued the awards. Therefore, Birch's
directive is not a reason to vacate the arbitrator's award in the case.").
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The Union's last argument was that the arbiter was biased, and
the awards were thereby "evident[ly] partial[ ]"178 Evident partial-
ity infers that the arbitrator had improper motives; a "mere appear-
ance of bias" is inadequate to satisfy this burden.' 79 The court
recognized that the arbitrator, Jeffrey Pash, was a prominent NFL
figurehead who had met with the Vikings on numerous occasions;
however, the court noted that the Union could have presumed
Pash would have interaction with the Vikings, given his position as
NFL General Counsel. 80 The court rejected the Union's claims
that Pash was biased based on his contacts with the Vikings and the
Williamses' attorney and ruled that the Union had foregone any
argument that Pash was "evidently partial" when it allowed the NFL
General Counsel to act as the independent arbitrator for the
case.' 8 ' The court noted that even if the Union had objected,
Pash's alleged partiality did not meet the requisite burden of "im-
proper motives." 8 2 Thus, the court did not vacate the arbitration
awards on the basis of Pash's alleged bias.'83 The court concluded
by reiterating its affirmation of the holdings of the district court on
all issues. 184
178. See id. (evaluating Union's claim that arbitrators were partial and thus
produced unfair rulings). The standard under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) for vacating an
arbitration award is "evident partiality or corruption." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2002).
179. See 3 Fed. Proc. § 4:119 (Lawyers ed. 2009) (identifying ways to prove
evident partiality).
180. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 885-86 (recognizing Pash's position as both arbi-
trator and NFL General Counsel, and justifying his meetings with Vikings and ap-
pointed counsel for both Williamses).
181. See id. at 886 ("[T]he Union waived any objection as to Pash's evident
partiality by failing to object to the general counsel for the NFL serving as
arbitrator.").
182. See id. (conceding even if Union had not "waived" issue, Pash's bias did
not amount to evident partiality). The Williams court referenced Dow Corning Corp.
v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. for idea of improper motives. See Dow Corning Corp. v.
Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 335 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2003) (vacating award based on
arbitrator's "improper motives").
183. See Williams, 582 F.3d 863, 886 ("Therefore, we decline to vacate the
award on this basis. In sum, we reject each of the Union's arguments for vacating
the awards. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order confirming the
awards.").
184. See id. (affirming district court judgment).
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1. Preemption Analysis and Confusing Nature of Existing Precedent
Section 301 preemption is a complex concept that requires a
case-by-case analysis and lacks general uniformity.185 The Williams
case presented a difficult issue for the NFL, because the league had
already conceded that its policy does not comply with Minnesota
state law.'8 6 Further, there was no on-point preemption precedent
on which the court could rely, since Williams was the first case of its
kind. 187
An important distinction the Court failed to acknowledge was
that DATWA was enacted prior to the aggravation of drug issues in
professional sports; this further illustrates the possibility that
DATWA was not intended to apply to professional sports leagues. 8 8
One commentator recognized that the NFL has a separate policy
for recreational drugs, thus the NFL would argue that DATWA
should be limited to recreational drug issues and inapplicable to
cases involving performance-enhancing drugs. 89 Further, subdivi-
185. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 4 (citing Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways,
255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001)) ("Section 301 preemption is a fact-specific in-
quiry that does not provide courts with a clear, bright-line rule.").
186. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 875 (8th Cir. 2009)
(noting NFL's concession of failure to comply with DAIWA, but arguing "differ-
ences are negligible and do not require the Court to invalidate the Williams' posi-
tive tests for bumetanide").
187. See Gregg Rosenthal, Latest StarCaps Decision Likely Means Williamses Will be
Available All Year, NBC Si'oRTs (May 21, 2010, 11:47 AM), http://profootball
talk. nbcsports.com/2010/05/21 /latest-starcaps-decision-likely-means-williamses-
will-be-available-all-year/ (acknowledging lack of precedent to guide StarCaps deci-
sion). "[Judge Larson explained] that the issues presented in the litigation 'were a
matter of first impression,' and that Larson had no precedent available to guide
him." Id. See also Brian Murphy, Kevin Williams Faces a Lighter NFL Suspension Under
New Labor Deal, FOX Sroars (Aug. 25, 2011, 12:29 AM), http://msn.foxsports.
com/nfl/story/Vikings-Kevin-Williams-likely-faces-2game-suspension-62538502
(calling StarCaps litigation a "precedent-setting case"); Brad Biggs, Kevin Williams
Will No Longer Appeal StarCaps Case, NATIONAL. FOOTBALL PosT (Mar. 11, 2011, 8:44
AM), http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/Kevin-Williams-will-no-longer-appeal-
StarCaps-case.html (quoting Pat Williams's agent calling case "unique" and one
that "merits further consideration").
188. See Ella, supra note 120 (recognizing twenty year anniversary of DATWA).
DATWA was enacted in 1987. See id. (referencing year of enactment). See Hanson,
supra note 21, at 366 (suggesting that DATWA was not enacted to combat perform-
ance-enhancing drug use in professional sports leagues, but rather to preclude
employers from overzealously punishing cocaine use by employees). This author
hypothesized that the NFL could argue that DATWA is applies to the NFL's sepa-
rate policy for recreational drugs, not its performance-enhancing drug policy. See
id. (describing scope of DATWA).
189. See Hanson, supra note 21, at 366 (suggesting court "may deduce that
DATWA should not apply"). DATWA was enacted in response to employers testing
for recreational drugs, and the NFL has a separate policy to target recreational
2012] 231
29
Gittleman: Home Field Advantage: Determining the Appropriate Turf for Willia
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
232 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
sion four of DATWA carves out an exception for professional sports
leagues for random drug testing; professional athletes may be ran-
domly tested for recreational drugs if they are subject to a CBA,
"but only to the extent consistent with the [CBA]."'"l' To combat
future preemption claims, the NFL could argue that the state legis-
lature intended for this exception to apply broadly to exempt pro-
fessional sports leagues from any DATWA provisions that conflicted
with league rules.' 9 '
As one commentator explained, the Eighth Circuit inappropri-
ately interpreted DATWA, focusing on the differences between NFL
policy and state drug policies instead of the actual requirements of
DATWA.19 2 DATWA was created by the state of Minnesota with no
consideration for its application to national sports leagues. 9 3
DATWA protects employees from unfair drug testing, whereas the
NFL policy seeks to establish and maintain fair competition.9 4
drugs; thus, DATWA may not apply. See id. (discussing possible limitations to scope
of DATWA). However, this argument could prove futile since the Policy does not
specify to which drugs or types of drugs it applies. See id. (reasoning that argument
would fail since Policy does not limit which types of drugs it regulates).
190. See Minn. Stat. § 181.951 (1991) (exempting professional sports leagues
from random testing requirements).
191. See Victor S. Broccoli, Williams v. NFL: The Eighth Circuit Flags the NFL for
Interference with State Drug Testing Laws, 17 SPoRTs LAw.J. 283, 300 (2010) (creating
possible defense for NFL). Mr. Broccoli states:
DATWA contains a provision exempting professional sports leagues from
DATWA's prohibition on random drug testing. The NFL would appear to
have a plausible argument that the Minnesota legislature intended to ex-
empt the NFL from other DATWA requirements that 'limit the ability of
sports leagues to test and punish for [performance enhancing drugs].
Id. (quoting The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports'Anti-Doping Programs at a Legal Cross-
roads? Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H.R Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong 18 (2009): Hearing Before the H. Energy and
Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 111th
Cong. 14 (2009) (statement of Gabriel A. Feldman)).
192. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 155 (analyzing Eighth Circuit's use and inter-
pretation of DATWA).
The Eighth Circuit in Williams ignored this argument, and instead simply
compared DATWA requirements with the procedures that the NFL fol-
lowed with respect to its drug testing of Players. However, that is not what
the DATWA commands; the DATWA requires courts to analyze and inter-
pret the Policy and its requirements so it can meaningfully compare them
to the requirements of the DATWA. Thus, the Williams court should have
preempted the claim, because the DATWA claims are 'inextricably inter-
twined with consideration of the terms of the [Policy].' The Eighth Cir-
cuit should have more closely examined the plain language of the
DATWA statute and understood it to mean that the court must examine
the CBA in its analysis.
Id.
193. See id. at 156 (noting original purpose of DATWA).
194. See id. at 156 (differentiating purposes of DATWA and NFL Policy).
[Vol. 19: p. 203
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/6
HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE
Thus, the Policy and DATWA have distinguishable objectives; this
makes the substitution of DATWA rules for the NFL policy
inappropnate.
Irrespective of this argument, the court's interpretation of
DATWA inferred a misguided analysis of the NFL's role as an em-
ployer and players' roles as employees.'9 5 The CBA, itself, stipu-
lates that the NFL does not directly employ players. 1 6 Thus, it is
difficult to argue that a determination on the DATWA claim can be
made without an examination of the relevant employee-employer
contract, which in this case is the NFL CBA.19 7 The court made a
distinction between "interpreting" and "consulting" a document,
explaining that an arbitrator would only need to consult the CBA to
understand whether the NFL was the players' employer.198 The dif-
ferences between the Minnesota policy, which prohibits suspen-
sions based on a first time drug offense, and the NFL Policy, which
institutes four-game suspensions for the same offense are worth not-
ing; there is a sharp contrast between the state's and the NFL's pun-
ishments for the same offense.' 9 The NFL argued that not
requiring preemption would essentially obliterate the value of hav-
ing a uniform policy.200 This contradicts the emphasis section 301
places on uniform laws, because construing the same terms in dif-
ferent ways depending on state law would irreparably disrupt the
interpretation and application of CBAs.2 01
With regard to the CPA claim, one commentator summarized
preceding case law and concluded, "whenever there are parties to, a
195. See Neumann, supra note 122 (describing employee-employer relation-
ship for DATWA purposes). For a further discussion of who employs NFL players,
see supra note 76 and infra note 196 and accompanying text.
196. See CBA (2006), supra note 77 (providing member clubs of NFL, not NFL
itself, employs players).
197. See id. (defining relationship between players and NFL and stipulating
contractual terms).
198. For a further discussion of this "interpretation" vs. "consultation" dichot-
omy, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
199. SeeJeffrey Standen, The Coming Federalization of Anti-Doping Policy, SPoRrs
LAw PROFF.ssoR (Nov. 2009), http://thesportslawprofessor.blogspot.com/2009_11
01_archive.html [hereinafter "The Coming Federalization"] (juxtaposing different
state and league policies).
200. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 877 (8th Cir. 2009)
(describing ramifications for not holding DATWA to be preempted). "[T]he NFL
argues that denying preemption and subjecting the Policy to divergent state regu-
lations would render the uniform enforcement of its drug testing policy, on which
it relies as a national organization for the integrity of its business, nearly impossi-
ble." Id.
201. See Local 174, Teamsters, Chaukfeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am.
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962) (emphasizing importance and practica-
bility of uniform law in interpreting collective bargaining agreements).
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collective-bargaining agreement, a Consumable Products Act claim
will be preempted."202 This commentator explained that although
claims are not preempted if they do not allege that the employer
violated the CPA, the employer could argue for preemption in state
court.1o3 Another commentator noted that the CPA was not
drafted with the intention to apply the Act to professional ath-
letes.204 This point is particularly relevant, given the unique em-
ployment arrangement in professional athletics where "employees"
work in over twenty states and directly compete against each other
for national recognition. 205 Most industries that boast employee
records in more than one state do not facilitate direct competition
between and among their employees. 206
The "inextricably intertwined" argument applied to the
DAWTA claims can similarly be applied to the CPA claim. 207 Coun-
sel for the NFL focused on the specific CPA language, "relates to a
bona fide occupational requirement," noting that the court could
not determine if the provision applies without specifically consult-
ing the CBA. 2 08 Determining whether the NFL violated the players'
202. Hanson, supra note 21, at 364.
203. See id. (describing rationale for inevitable preemption in CPA claims in-
volving CBAs).
204. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 157 (summarizing Minnesota legislature's in-
tended application of CPA and suggesting its limited application to professional
sports leagues).
205. See NFL Teams, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Sept. 25,
2011) (listing NFL teams by division). There are multiple states with more than
one team,.and some states with no professional football team. See id. (identifying
teams by city and team name). The states with NFL teams include: Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id. (listing
names of cities that host NFL teams). See NFL Schedule- Playoffs, NFL, http://www.
nfl.com/schedules?seasonType=POST (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (providing ex-
ample of NFL playoff schedule, indicating competition between teams for national
recognition as Super Bowl champions).
206. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 157 (explaining NFL teams' desires to com-
pete among each other, rather than "drive each other out of business").
207. For a further discussion of DATWA preemption argument, see supra
notes 118-126 and accompanying text.
208. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 6 ("The NFL has a strong argument that a
court would need to interpret the terms of the NFL collective bargaining agree-
ment to determine if punishment for use of a particular drug related to a bona
fide occupational requirement of the NFL. That is, the NFL has a persuasive claim
that an analysis of the CPA's 'bona fide occupational requirement' is inextricably
intertwined with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and thus should
be preempted.").
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CPA rights requires an interpretation of the CBA, the governing
employment document. 0 1
The Williams case presented a relatively novel issue for the
Eighth Circuit, and certainly one that exposed weaknesses in the
NFL's current policies.210 In its petition for writ of certiorari, the
NFL noted that the appeals court's analysis exacerbates conflict
among circuit courts, thus necessitating Supreme Court review. 211
The writ further charged that the Eighth Circuit's decision would
subject the CBA to "conflicting . . . interpretations and enforce-
ment . . . of a single collective bargaining agreement" which would
"render [ ] uniform interpretation and operation of the collective
bargaining agreement impossible."2 12 Thus, the Williams decision
had the potential to cause far-reaching effects on professional ath-
letics programs and their respective collective bargaining
agreements. 213
The Eighth Circuit previously ruled on a few cases involving
the intersection of section 301 and CBAs; however, the Williams de-
cision reflects a deviation from the general trend of the circuit's
holdings. 214 In both Trustees and Gore v. Trans World Airlines,215 the
court held that section 301 preempted the plaintiffs' claims due to
the relationship between the plaintiff's claims and the CBA; in this
genre of cases, the court must analyze whether the resolution of the
state law claim depends on the language and meaning of the
CBA. 21 6 To apply state laws to "evade compliance with [a CBA's]
209. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 156 (arguing CPA claim should have been
preempted).
210. For a further discussion on lack of precedent for Eighth Circuit to follow
in Williams v. NFL, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
211. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 863 (8th Cir. 2009),
petition for cert. filed, 2010 WL 1932622 (U.S. May 13, 2010) (No. 09-1380) (urging
Supreme Court to hear case to settle inconsistencies in circuit courts).
212. Id.
213. For a further discussion of impact on professional sports leagues, see
supra note 9 and infra note 255 and accompanying text.
214. See Broccoli, supra note 191, at 288-90 (describing some previous hold-
ings of Eighth Circuit involving similar labor law issues and interpretations of
CBAs).
215. 210 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2000).
216. See Trs. of Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Water-
proofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 334 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding plaintiffs claims insepa-
rable from analysis of CBA). Superior, a caulking and waterproofing company, was
a party to a collective bargaining agreement that required the company to provide
monthly fringe benefits to employees. See id. at 327 (listing facts). Superior failed
to comply with a fringe benefit audit, and Superior's owner claimed that he only
wanted the CBA fringe benefits to apply, and thus would only make contributions
for Union employees. See id. (describing circumstances of case). Superior argued
that the action was not preempted under section 301; the Union charged that
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terms under federal law" would eviscerate Congress's goals of uni-
formity and equitable enforcement.217 In Bogan, the Eighth Circuit
provided an example of a state claim that did not require preemp-
tion since the plaintiffs claim did not stem from the CBA.2 18 Addi-
tionally, Supreme Court precedent mandates that state claims that
involve interpretation of the relevant CBAs be strictly within federal
jurisdiction.2 19 This confusion about the consultation of the CBA
preemption was necessary. See id. at 329-30 (evaluating preemption). Ultimately,
the Court upheld the district court's finding that preemption was necessary, find-
ing that the language of the CBA was at issue and the state law claims were "inextri-
cably intertwined." See id. at 334 (upholding district court holding, thus
necessitating preemption). See Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 952
(8th Cir. 2000) (explaining plaintiffs claims were inseparable from language of
CBA, thus necessitating interpretation of CBA). This case involved a Trans World
Airlines (TWA) employee who made threats about his life and the lives of his co-
workers. See id. at 947 (describing facts of case). The TWA CBA contained lan-
guage regarding prohibited conduct and banning firearm possession. See id.
(expressing provisions of CBA). The employee, Gore, was eventually rehired after
undergoing psychological evaluation, and he subsequently filed a state law claim.
See id. at 948 (providing background on procedural posture). The court found
that Gore's claims were "inextricably intertwined" with the language of the CBA,
thus necessitating preemption. Id. Gore did not reference the CBA in his com-
plaint; however, his claims were based on his employer's adherence to the terms of
the CBA, thus creating inextricable intertwining with the CBA. See id. at 950 (dis-
cussing CBA and need for preemption). See also Broccoli, supra note 191, at 289
(describing holdings in Trustees of Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds and
Gore).
217. Trustees, 450 F.3d at 334.
218. See Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832-33 (8th Cir. 2007)
(finding plaintiffs claims not "inextricably intertwined," and thus not preempted
by section 301). A private investigator reported that plaintiff was selling and/or
using drugs at General Motors during work hours. See id. at 829 (summarizing
facts). The court stated that the CBA reflected her employer's rights to termina-
tion; there was no language about employees' rights upon termination. See id. at
833 (analyzing language regarding employee rights). Thus, her claim was not "in-
extricably intertwined" with the CBA. See id. (determining preemption not neces-
sary). See also Broccoli, supra note 191, at 289 (describing facts of Bogan case and
discussing lack of preemption).
219. See Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 863 (8th Cir. 2009),
petition for cert. filed, 2010 WL 1932622 (U.S. May 13, 2010) (No. 09-1380), (refer-
encing Supreme Court labor law cases that have required preemption when state
law claims involve language of CBA). See also e.g., United Steelworkers v. Rawson,
495 U.S. 362, 363 (1990) (concluding plaintiff's tort claim pre-empted by section
301 because mine inspection procedure was tied to CBA despite fact that duty
stemmed from inspection, not language of CBA); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) ("[A]n application of state law is pre-empted
by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such application
requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement."); Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 221 (1984) (holding when "resolution of a state-law
claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made
between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301
claim . . . or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law" and reversing
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
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exposes the issues with the current definitions for preemption, and
the unclear language of the frequently cited case law.2 20
While the court followed the Allis-Chalmers "inextricably inter-
twined" preemption test, its application of this test did not comport
with other preemption cases.22' The "inextricably intertwined" test
is subjective and variable, as evidenced by disparate holdings and
analyses of the meaning of this phrase. 222 The court improperly
concluded that the Williamses' claims were not sufficiently inextri-
cably entangled with the NFL CBA to constitute *or justify
preemption.223
Further, as one legal analyst postured, the Williams decision
contradicts prior section 301 analyses in NFL cases. 224 This com-
mentator summarized two NFL cases that involved tort allegations;
in both cases, the athletes' efforts to trump state law claims over
NFL uniform policies were unsuccessful and the players' claims
were preempted.225 The Williams case was the first of its kind to test
the boundaries of the NFL's CBA when its policies rival state
laws. 226 This lack of precedent reiterates the need for Supreme
Court evaluation to guide future preemption cases involving profes-
sional sports leagues' CBAs.2 27
U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (holding federal law is appropriate legal standard for section
301(a) claims tinder Labor Management Relations Act).
220. For a further discussion of confusing preemption terminology, see supra
notes 113-115 and infra notes 275-278 and accompanying text.
221. For a further discussion of Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck and other preemp-
tion cases, see supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
222. See Regina Goshern, Comment, Section 301, Tortious Interference and the
Sixth Circuit: Immunization for the Tortfeasor, 82 U. DET. MERcy L. Rev. 253, 261
(2005) (commenting on subjective nature of preemption test). For a further dis-
cussion of preemption cases, see supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
223. For a further discussion of the court's preemption analysis and findings,
see supra notes 136-171 and accompanying text.
224. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 142-44 (pointing out differences between Wil-
liams holding and trend of law). Ms. Koziol focused on Stringer v. Nat'l Football
League, 474 F. Supp.2d 894 (S.D. Ohio 2007) and Holmes v. Nat'l Football League, 939
F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1996). In both Stringer and Holmes, the respective courts
held that the players' (or their estates') claims were preempted by section 301, as
their claims were "inextricably intertwined" with the CBA. See Stringer, 474
F.Supp.2d at 900-01 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (introducing defendants' claims and apply-
ing preemption test); Holmes, 939 F. Supp. at 527 (holding Holmes' claims were
inextricably intertwined with NFL CBA, and adjudication of Holmes' allegation
required interpretation of CBA). See also Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 87 F.3d
717, 718 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding all claims preempted by 301).
225. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 144 (considering trend of unsuccessful pre-
emption claims to challenge court's holding in Williams).
226. For a discussion of lack of precedent, see supra note 187 and accompany-
ing text.
227. See e.g., John Krawcyznski, NFL Appealing StarCaps Case to US Supreme
Court, SIGN ON SAN DIEco (May 13, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://network.yardbarker.
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The Williams case, and the national attention it garnered, ex-
posed weaknesses in the Supreme Court's preemption case law.
The Williams case presented the novel issue of how to deal with
state law claims that were not drafted with the intent of applying to
specific employment arenas, as is the case with the Minnesota
DATWA and CPA claims.228 The vague phrase of "inextricably in-
tertwined" also leaves a gap in existing precedent that requires at-
tention; this could be remedied by specifically outlining what is
meant by this phrase when comparing state law claims to non-tradi-
tional union agreements. 229 The forum decision in Williams was di-
rectly dependent upon interpretation of the preemption language;
in fact, legal expert Professor Gabriel A. Feldman posited that a
different court could have arrived at a different holding regarding
the preemption questions.23 1
An evaluation under federal law would not guarantee a victory
for the NFL, but rather a just evaluation of their arguments in the
appropriate forum (federal rather than state court).23 1 The tort
claims in Williams required preemption, evidencing the relatively
inextricable interconnection between many legal claims and the ap-
plicable CBA. 232 Given Supreme Court precedent, this was an ap-
propriate conclusion; the tort claims could not be evaluated
com/nfl/article external/nfl-appealing-starcaps-case to-us-supreme court/
2587668 ("The NFL wants the case settled on the federal level to overrule the state
court proceedings and establish that rules of the CBA are not subject to individual
state laws."); Koziol, supra note 7, at 164, 167 (recommending that Supreme Court
reverse Eighth Circuit's decision and supporting notion that precedent could alle-
viate confusion).
228. For a further discussion about inapplicability of DATWA and CPA to
NFL claims, see supra notes 188-194,204 and accompanying text.
229. For a further discussion of unclear language of preemption doctrine, see
infra notes 275-278 and accompanying text.
230. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 6 (discussing whether defenses can "serve
as a basis for triggering preemption" and noting potential for inconsistent hold-
ings among different courts in different states, evidencing possible inequities in
application and interpretation of similar statutes in different states). "[A] differ-
ent court within the Eighth Circuit could have reached a different conclusion in
this case." Id. at 7. Feldman proceeded to state:
I do not believe that there is a clear 'right' answer with respect to the
preemption issue, and the resolution of any claim will vary depending on
the terms of the specific state statute at issue, but I do believe that a differ-
ent court - even within the Eighth circuit - could have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion based on the same set of facts presented in the Williams
case.
Id.
231. For a further discussion on appropriate venue for claims involving CBAs,
see supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
232. For a further discussion of preemption and "inextricable intertwine-
ment," see supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
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without consulting the CBA. 233 This is not to say that preemption
should be uniformly instituted for all cases involving the NFL CBA,
but the specificity of both the CBA and the Policy, particularly with
regard to their drug provisions, necessitated its evaluation for both
the DATWA and CPA claims in the Williams case. 234
2. Policy Implications
The implications of this case, in addition to the national atten-
tion it garnered, are primarily grounded in policy rationale.23 5 The
NFL has stressed the importance of a uniform policy - with profes-
sional football teams in twenty-two states, it would be impractical
and inequitable for players in different states to abide by different
drug rules.2 3 6 In fact, this idea of uniformity is the hallmark of the
preemption doctrine.2 37 Enforcing uniform policies is important to
the NFL, among other sports leagues, to maintain a fair and com-
petitive playing field.2 3 The chief concern is to ensure that mem-
bers of the NFL are not afforded physical advantages against
opponents resulting from a more lenient state drug policy.23" The
233. For a further discussion of precedent, see supra notes 101-110 and ac-
companying text.
234. For a further discussion of background of NFL CBA and Policy and ratio-
nale behind preemption of DATWA and CPA claims, see supra notes 53-130 and
accompanying text.
235. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 157-165 (suggesting larger implications of Wil-
liams decision, both in the NFL and outside the realm of professional sports, and
potential for "disastrous ramifications").
236. For a list of states with NFL teams, see supra note 205 and accompanying
text. See NFL Teams, supra note 53 (listing current NFL team names and affiliated
cities); Feldman, supra note 96, at 11 ("A professional sports league such as the
NFL ... has a heightened interest in maintaining a uniform performance enhanc-
ing drug policy. The reason for the heightened interest becomes clear when one
identifies the product created by the NFL and its teams. The NFL is composed of
autonomous, separately owned teams that compete with each other on a number
of levels. Yet, these teams are also interdependent and cooperate in a number of
areas.... [T] he NFL and its teams cooperate to create a season of games, includ-
ing the playoffs and a championship game, involving teams that are relatively
evenly matched and operate on a 'level playing field.' . . . A non-uniform perform-
ance enhancing drug policy might interfere with the ability of the league to main-
tain competitive balance.").
237. For a further discussion of policy rationale behind preemption, see supra
note 93 and infra note 277 and accompanying text.
238. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 11-12 (recognizing importance of national
uniformity); Brief of Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, L.L.C., The
National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, Williams v. Nat'l Football League, No. 09-1380 (Jun. 14,
2010) (describing negative impact Williams case could have on uniform drug poli-
cies of other national sports leagues with teams in more than one state).
239. See Robert L. Clayton & V. John Ella, Federal Court Tackles NFL Drug Test-
ing Program, HACKNEY PUBICATIONS (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.hackneypublica-
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NFL is in a unique position because it seeks to promote competi-
tion among its associated entities rather than trying to create a mo-
nopoly of one entity over another.240 Most other national
companies do not physically compete against other branches or
teams of their employer.24 ' The NFL argued that denying preemp-
tion, and instead deciding this case in state court, created inconsis-
tencies between policies applied to players in Minnesota and
players that played in any other state. 242 Anything less than a uni-
form standard could encourage "cherry-picking" among state
standards.243
The purpose of section 301 preemption is to ensure uniform
application of CBA provisions; the underlying rationale is that par-
ties would be less motivated to engage in collective bargaining if
there was a lack of uniformity in the meanings of the terms of the
CBA.244 The Williams case illustrates the inherent issues with pre-
empting NFL policies with individual state laws; although the Saints
and Vikings players alike took bumetanide, the Saints players would
have to serve suspensions for a first-time offense, while the Vikings
players would not.2 4 5 If the Vikings and Saints had played each
other following this case, the Williamses would have played while
tions.com/sla/archive/000925.php (commenting on importance of integrity of
league and maintenance of level playing field).
240. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 157 (differentiating NFL from most other
multi-state businesses). Most businesses that operate in more than one state are
not fostering direct competition between the entities. See id. (commenting on
unique nature of NFL).
241. See Clayton & Ella, supra note 239 (recognizing differences between NFL
and most other employers, issue that complicates this preemption analysis).
242. SeeJon Krawcyznski, NFL Appealing StarCaps Case to US Supreme Court, HuF-
FINGTON POST (May 13, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/
20100513/fbn-nfl-suspensions/ (comparing Minnesota's with other states' drug
policies). Specifically, the NFL's brief charged that denying preemption "created
one collectively bargained rule for NFL players in Minnesota and a different rule
under the same collective bargaining agreement for all other NFL players." Id.
243. See Vikings, NFL To Face-Off in Court Over Doping Rule, WFAA-TV (Mar. 8,
2010), http://www.wfaa.com/sports/football/Vikiings-NFL-To-Face-Off-In-Court-
Over-Doping-Rule-86942012.html (advocating for uniform standards rather than
state-by-state discretion); see Feldman, supra note 96, at 14 (listing states whose poli-
cies conflict with NFL drug policy, suggesting broader scope of Williams issue).
There are five states with drug policies that conflict with the NFL Policy; these
states are Arizona, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, and North Carolina. See id.
(listing states with drug regulations that conflict with NFL Policy).
244. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 5 (explaining rationale for section 301
preemption and potential for conflicting interpretations of CBAs in accordance
with varying state laws).
245. See James Alder, StarCaps Ruling Could Give Vikings Unfair Advantage,
AnOUT.COM (Sept. 13, 2009), http://football.about.com/b/2009/09/13/starcaps-
ruling-gives-vikings-unfair-advantage.htm (highlighting discrepancy in punishment
between Saints players and Vikings players based on different state drug policies).
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the Saints players, who had committed the same offense, were side-
lined. 246 A state could potentially change its drug policies to secure
the additional money and resources that come with having a cham-
pionship-winning team.247 Assuming this tactic was successful in
the NFL, it could be adopted by other professional sports
leagues. 248 Thus, the Williams decision could create a precedent for
changing state laws to reflect a particular team's desire to break the
rules of the NFL CBA in a way the NFL could not police.249 Addi-
tionally, the integrity of the league is at stake; insinuations that the
NFL kept information from players in an effort to trap them tar-
nishes the image of the league that was organized to monitor one
of the nation's favorite pastimes. 250
For a further discussion of Minnesota's "One Free Strike" rule, see supra notes 123-
124 and accompanying text.
246. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 12 ("The NFL runs into a problem if the
three Saints are suspended for four games, but the Vikings - because of Minnesota
state law - cannot be suspended at all. It is 'unfair' to the Saints players that they
were treated more harshly than the Vikings players for engaging in the same mis-
conduct. But, perhaps more significantly, the more lenient treatment of the Vik-
ings players gives the Vikings team a competitive advantage . . . on the field.").
247. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 157-58 (analyzing implications of Williams
decision on league fairness and competitive advantage).
Other states can now perhaps manipulate the decision in Williams to pos-
sibly secure a competitive advantage for their respective home teams.
State legislatures could draft laws similar to Minnesota's CPA in order to
ensure that professional sports team within its jurisdiction would be al-
lowed to take performance enhancing drugs without recourse.
Id. at 158. See James Alder, Super Bowl Player Bonus Shares, AnoUT.COM, http://
football.about.com/od/histo2/a/SBbonus.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (listing
bonuses paid to winning and losing Super Bowl competitors).
248. See Appeals Court Rules For Williamses, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2009, 9:12 PM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4464771 (quoting Goodell's predic-
tion that Williams could affect other leagues). Goodell expressed:
It is putting in jeopardy a drug program that has been in front of the
entire world as being one of the highest standards of all sports.. . . It puts
in jeopardy that players in Minnesota in any sport - this could affect
other sports - are subject to a different standard than in the other 49
states. You recognize it is a fairness question for all athletes.
Id. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 158 ("International sports organizations, such as the
Major League Baseball ('MLB') and the National Basketball Association ('NBA'),
will now likely struggle to enforce a uniform set of rules in various states, since laws
in different states can now seemingly outlaw the ability of the league to maintain
an equal playing field."). For a further discussion on potential impact on other
leagues, see supra note 238 and accompanying text.
249. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 158 (suggesting other areas of CBA for which
states could change laws to accommodate teams' desires to take actions that would
otherwise violate NFL policies).
250. For a further discussion of the accusations that NFL officials knew Star-
Caps contained bumetanide and intentionally withheld this information, see supra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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V. IMPACT
NFL Spokesman Greg Aiello called this lawsuit a "state law end-
around that [could] undermine all anti-doping policies in
sports." 2 5' Representative Harry Waxman of California opined that
the Eighth Circuit's ruling makes the drug policy ineffective and
inhibits the NFL from enforcing its own policies.252 There is a po-
tential for every state to have a different interpretation and applica-
tion of the NFL's CBA that hinges upon the respective state's drug
testing laws.2 5 3 Thus, the publicity and potential to significantly af-
fect the efficacy of the NFL's CBA and Policy made the resolution
of this case an important goal for both the NFL and its players.254
This ruling could create an escape valve for athletes - players
could challenge their suspensions under state law rather than com-
plying with the CBA and Policy to which they are contractually com-
mitted. 255 Going forward, it would be advantageous for employers
to write their policies to require interpretation of the CBA or an
applicable policy to resolve state law claims.256 A similar suggestion
is to make the NFL's Policy conform with the most stringent state
policies; an employment and labor law newsletter opined, "[f] or all
employers, and especially unionized employers and those with a
251. See Vikings, NFL To Face-Off in Court Over Doping Rule, supra note 243
(quoting Greg Aiello); Williams Suspension Case: NFL Goes to Supreme Court to Over-
turn Minnesota Ruling, ESPN (May 13, 2010, 8:46 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=5186165 ("The NFL's brief said remanding the case to state
court 'created one collectively bargained rule for NFL players in Minnesota and a
different rule under the same collective bargaining agreement for all other NFL
players.'").
252. See Wayne Coffey, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodellfinds Congressional Ally in
Attempt to Suspend Two Vikings Players, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.
nydailynews.com/sports/football/2009/11/03/2009-11-03_goodell seekscon-
gressional-help.html (referencing Representative Waxman's recommendations
for maintaining authority and encouraging enforcement of NFL policies). Wax-
man predicted, "[i]f these rulings prevail, they could wreak havoc with policies
designed to curb performance-enhancing drug use in professional sports . . . [the
new] legal interpretations could render . .. drug-testing programs unenforceable,
loophole-ridden and unacceptably weak and ineffective." See id. (stating agree-
ment with Goodell); see also Tracy, supra note 9, at 263 (discussing suggestions for
congressional involvement in drug policies in professional sports leagues).
253. See Feldman, supra note 96, at 13 (predicting if Eighth Circuit's holding
becomes general trend, NFL would have to observe every state's policies).
254. For a discussion of potential impact of Williams v. NFL, see infra notes
255-285 and accompanying text.
255. See Schmidt, supra note 9 (warning that ruling impinge upon league's
right to enforce their own discipline policies). For a further discussion on poten-
tial implications for other sports leagues, see supra note 248 and accompanying
text.
256. See Deitchler, supra note 118 (strategizing ways policy writers could en-
sure preemption of claims).
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multi-state presence, there is no substitute for reviewing personnel
policies on a state-by-state basis to ensure they are in compliance
with employment laws such as DATWA and the CPA."25 7 If Minne-
sota became the model state, NFL players could not be suspended
for first time drug offenses. 258 In some respects, this would eviscer-
ate the value of having an organization draft its own CBA.2* Fur-
ther, weakening the NFL drug policy to accommodate the states
that have more lenient standards seems counterintuitive to the orig-
inal intent of enacting drug regulations. 260 This would also subject
NFL drug laws to constant amendments, as state laws rarely remain
static. 26'
Some commentators also addressed the possibility of congres-
sional involvement.262 The sports leagues and the U.S. Anti-Doping
Agency requested that Congress create a national drug testing stan-
dard and preclude players from challenging drug policy punish-
ments in state courts.2 63 In November 2009, NFL Commissioner
Goodell solicited congressional support, specifically that of the En-
ergy and Commerce Committee and the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, to implement such a
257. Deitchler, supra note 118. SeeJeffrey Standen, The Starcaps Case and the
Impending NFL Labor Fight, Sr'oRTs LAW PROFESSOR (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.
thesportslawprofessor.blogspot.com/2009/09/starcaps-case-and-impending-nfl-la-
bor.html (explaining possibility of creating "lowest common denominator" agree-
ment); Feldman, supra note 96, at 13 (discussing possibility of instituting NFL
policy that is only as strict as the most "lenient" or "employee-friendly" state poli-
cies); Koziol, supra note 7, at 165 (posing suggestion to write policy to comply with
most stringent state standards).
258. See Minn. Stat. §§ 81.950-181.957 (2010) (outlining procedure for disci-
pline of drug-related offenses in Minnesota under DATWA).
259. See Deitchler, supra note 118 ("[A]fter Williams, there will be few, if any,
affirmative acts an employer may take in policy administration to assure preemp-
tion where state law provides so much detail regarding compliance requirements
that a reviewing court would need merely to compare employer action to those
requirements. CBAs, in other words, would add little in the way of interpretation
except, possibly, with respect to mandatory statutory requirements for a written
policy's content.").
260. For a further discussion of NFL drug policy, see supra notes 3, 71-62 and
accompanying text. The StarCaps case has already "taken some of the shine off a
once-respected NFL drug testing program." Alex Marvez, Starcaps Case is a Blow to
NFL Drug Policy, FOX S'oRTs (Sept. 16, 2009, 3:51 PM), http://msn.foxsports.
com/nfl/story/Starcaps-case-is-a-blow-to-NFL-drug-policy.
261. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 165 (referencing dynamic nature of state
laws).
262. See e.g. Shepard, supra note 45, at 545-46 (summarizing NFL's request to
Congress to resolve issue through nationally-run drug testing).
263. See Mears, supra note 50 (mentioning suggestions filed by national pro-
fessional sports leagues and U.S. Anti-Doping Agency); Clayton & Ella, supra note
239 (suggesting congressional oversight of drug policy administration).
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standard.264 Goodell sought the application of the Policy in all fifty
states, noting "a specific and tailored amendment to the Labor
Management Relations Act is appropriate and necessary to protect
collectively bargained steroid policies from attack under state
law."265
A separate bill, the Clean Sports Protection Act, was intro-
duced in September 2010 in response to the Williams litigation;
however, this bill never became law, thus leaving the NFL suscepti-
ble to future preemption cases. 266
In March 2011, Kevin Williams ceased legal action appealing
his suspension; Pat Williams continued to appeal to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.2 6 7 As of April 2011, the Williams case was resolved,
when a federal judge dismissed the players' claims and upheld their
suspensions.268 On April 28, 2011, the Minnesota Supreme Court
issued an order denying review of an appeals court decision favor-
ing the NFL's suspensions of the players, thus concluding years of
264. See Daniel Hauptman, Comment, The Need for a Worldwide Draft to Level the
Playing Field and Strike Out the National Origin Discrimination in Major League Baseball,
30 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. Riv. 263, 290 (2010) (mentioning Commissioner Goodell's
appeal to Congress). Goodell requested that Congress "change federal labor laws
to prevent states from interfering with the league's efforts to enforce its banned
substances policy." Id.
265. Goodell Wants Law Changed, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 3, 2009), http://arti-
cles.boston.coin/2009-11-03/sports/29260785 1_steroid-policies-state-court-roger-
goodell; see Coffey, supra note 9 (quoting Goodell's statement before Congress re-
garding uniform NFL steroid policies).
266. See Clean Sports Protection Act, S. 3851, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (pro-
posing legislation to govern preemption between sports league policies and state
law policies). This bill was introduced on September 28, 2010 by Senator Byron
Dorgan and was a direct response to the Williams case. See Senate Bill Would
Strengthen Sports Drug League Problems, NFL (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.nflcom-
munications.com/2010/09/28/senate-bill-would-strengthen-sports-league-drug-
programs/ (summarizing content of proposed legislation and citing NFL sup-
port). "The bill is a federal legislative response to the 'StarCaps' case in Minnesota
and means that, if passed, drug testing programs would pre-empt state laws if these
programs are more likely to detect performance enhancing drugs." Id. The bill
was introduced and referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation; however, neither the Senate nor House voted on the bill. See S.
3851: Clean Sports Protection Act, GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=s111-3851 (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (condensing status of bill).
267. SeeJeremy Fowler, Kevin Williams Opts Not to Appeal Latest StarCaps Ruling,
Takes One Step Closer to Missing Four Games in 2011, TwIN CITIES (Mar. 10, 2011, 8:29
PM), http://blogs.twincities.com/Vikings/2011/03/kevin-williams-opts-not-to-
app.html (addressing Pat Williams' and Kevin Williams' respective decisions re-
garding pursuing StarCaps appeals).
268. SeeJason Cole, NFL Wins StarCaps case, YAHOo SPORTS (May 23, 2011),
http://www.sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=jc-nflstarcaps052309 (reporting fed-
eral court holding in StarCaps litigation).
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litigation for the NFL and the Williamses. 26m Ultimately, the Wil-
liamses served two game suspensions and paid fines of two game
checks at the beginning of the 2011-2012 NFL season. 270
The CBA under which the Williams case was evaluated was set
to expire in March 2011, providing the NFL an opportunity to re-
write their policies to accommodate the suggestions posed by a
number of commentators. 271 The NFL could have drafted lan-
guage in the new CBA to prevent similar preemption issues from
arising in the future. 272 Under the newly negotiated CBA, testing
positive for diuretics carries a two-game suspension punishment; in
fact, Kevin Williams benefitted from this "more nuanced penalty
system." 27 3 Thus, the NFL made some changes to the CBA to re-
flect the issues the Williams case exposed, but it did not remedy this
issue completely.274
269. See Smith, supra note 15 ("The Minnesota Supreme Court hasjust issued
this morning an order denying a review of the appeals court decision that went in
favor of the league.... The result is the case is over and we, the NFL, prevailed in
the case. So there is a court in Minnesota that rules in our favor from time to
time."). See generally Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 868, 874-86
(8th Cir. 2009), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 598 F.3d 932 (affirming dis-
trict court's holding, rejecting NFL's claims for preemption of DATWA and CPA
claims, finding players' state law claims preempted, and denying Union's claim
advocating arbitration awards be vacated.); Nat'l Football League v. Williams, 582
F.3d 863, 863 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 566 (2010) (denying petition
for writ of certiorari to United States Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit).
270. See NFL Suspends Vikes' Williams, Saints' Smith in StarCaps Case, NFL.com
(Sept. 2, 2011, 1:16 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d821ea898/ar-
ticle/nfl-suspends-vikes-williams-saints-smith-in-starcaps-case (updating punish-
ment imposed on Williamses for drug policy violation). Kevin Williams sat out of
the first two Vikings games of the 2011-2012 season; Pat Williams served his suspen-
sion while unsigned. See Mike Florio, StarCaps Suspensions Finally are Finalized, NBC
SPORTs (Sept. 2, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://profootbalitalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/
02/starcaps-suspensions-finally-are-finalized/ (reporting ultimate punishments for
players who took StarCaps).
271. See Brian Galliford, NFL CBA Set To Expire This Evening As Lockout Looms,
SB NATION (Mar. 3, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.buffalorumblings.com/2011/3/
3/2026997/nfl-lockout-cba-negotiations-deadline (reporting anticipated expira-
tion of NFL CBA and expected lockout). For a further discussion of commenta-
tors' suggestions, see supra notes 256-266 and accompanying text.
272. For a further discussion of the Williams case timeline, see supra notes
267-270 and accompanying text.
273. See NFL Suspends Vikes' Williams, Saints' Smith in StarCaps Case, supra note
270 (comparing two game suspension for diuretics with previous CBA's four game
suspension policy).
274. See Kevin Seifert, Costly Challenge for Vikings' Kevin Williams, ESPN (Sept.
2, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/nfcnorth/post_/id/305561/costly-
challenge-for-vikings-kevin-williams (noting change in sanction duration under
new CBA). The previous CBA provided for four-game suspensions; the new CBA
has a two-tiered system that differentiates between diuretic and drug use. See id.
(commenting on change in policy). See generally Collective Bargaining Agreement,
2012] 245
43
Gittleman: Home Field Advantage: Determining the Appropriate Turf for Willia
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
246 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Furthermore, the language of section 301 is confusing and dif-
ficult to apply in a non-traditional union setting.275 As one Berke-
ley Law professor posited,
Preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act has been described as a 'thicket,' a 'tangled
and confusing interplay between federal and state law'
and 'one of the most confusing areas of federal court liti-
gation.' Despite recent efforts by the United States Su-
preme Court to eliminate the confusion, lower federal
courts and state courts continue to struggle with this
issue.276
The preemption doctrine, itself, is grounded in policy rationale.277
Even the landmark phrase "inextricably intertwined" lacks a uni-
form definition or standard, as evidenced by incongruent holdings
by various courts.278 Creating a uniform definition of "inextricably
intertwined" could alleviate some existing confusion about the req-
uisite level of "interpretation" vs. "consultation" required to justify
preempting a state law claim.2 79 This solution could benefit not
NFL (2011), http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-
agreement-2011-2020.pdf (lacking provisions to remedy preemption issue).
275. See Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIo ST. L.J. 511, 515
(2010) (calling preemption doctrine "thin and confusing"); David B. Spence &
Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A
Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. Ri.V. 1125, 1146 (1999) ("Supremacy Clause pre-
emption cases turn on questions of statutory interpretation . . . they have proven
just as vexing to the courts as have Commerce Clause cases, and have produced an
equally conflicted and fractured body of case law.").
276. Adams, supra note 93, at 107.
277. See Stein, supra note 112, at 3 (analyzing Supreme Court policy rationale
advocating uniformity). Stein notes:
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 as authorizing the fed-
eral courts to create a body of federal common law governing the en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements. The preemption
argument, which the Supreme Court has accepted, is that allowing cov-
ered employees to bring certain state law claims would conflict with the
purposes behind having this federal common law. Specifically, the Su-
preme Court has argued that permitting such suits could undermine the
goal of having a single uniform law to govern their interpretation of col-
lective bargaining agreements, and could undermine the role of the arbi-
trator as the principal interpreter of such agreements.
Id.
278. For a further discussion of application of "inextricably intertwined" and
disparate application of this term, see supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
279. For a further discussion of this "interpretation" vs. "consultation" dichot-
omy, see supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
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only professional sports leagues, but also any employer who relies
on a CBA.2 s0
Regardless of the upshot of the Williams case, it is undeniable
that this case has garnered, and will continue to garner, national
attention and has the potential to drastically change the process of
drafting CBAs.281 As preemption law is primarily judge-made, a
sound resolution of this case would have been to create Supreme
Court precedent for section 301 as it applies to professional sports
leagues' CBAs.28 2 However, on November 8, 2010, the Supreme
Court of the United States denied certiorari, thus halting the NFL's
efforts to create a national precedent regarding preemption of pro-
fessional sports leagues' agreements. 283
Only time will tell how greatly this case will impact the realm of
professional sports leagues and their collective bargaining agree-
ments. The fact that the Supreme Court of the United States de-
nied certiorari and the new NFL CBA did not account for the
Williams debacle suggests that the issue of preemption could arise
again soon.2" If the Williams case becomes the legal trend, profes-
sional sports leagues could embark on a slippery slope of pardoning
280. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 160-61 (expounding upon wider implications
of Williams and potential effect on employers who rely on CBAs); National Football
League v. Williams, ASU SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW BLOG (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://asusportslaw.wordpress.com/2010/10/29/national-football-league-v-wil-
liams/ ("This case should be a very interesting one to keep an eye on. The resolu-
tion of these issues will affect more than just the Williams's fate - it will have
resonating implications on the rest of the League and its power to regulate and
enforce rules in various States.").
281. See Koziol, supra note 7, at 160-61 (suggesting potential impact on draft-
ing of future CBAs).
282. See id. at 164 (reiterating preemption concept is judge-made). "Some
have speculated that because the preemptive scope of labor law is judge-made, it is
possible that the Supreme Court will hear the case and expand the scope of Sec-
tion 301 preemption." Id. at 164. For an additional perspective on preemption as
judge-made law, see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
283. See SCOTUS BLOG, supra note 50 (referencing United States Supreme
Courts' denial of certiorari); NFL Wants Supreme Court to Settle the StarCaps Case,
STEROImSOuRcEs.cOM (May 17, 2010, 8:13 PM), http://www.steroidsources.com/
Steroid-Information/2010/05/nfl-wants-supreme-court-to-settle-starcaps-case/
(discussing NFL's appeal to Supreme Court of the United States to hear case and
create precedent).
To avoid a similar StarCaps case in the future, the NFL asks the Supreme
Court to make a ruling in favor of their drug policies. They are hoping
that the high court will recognize the internal policy of the league as well
as other sports organizations despite differing state laws and guidelines.
SCOTUS BLOc, supra note 50
284. For a further discussion of potential residual effects of lack of Supreme
Court precedent for professional sports leagues' CBAs and specific provisions
under new CBA, see supra notes 273-274, 282-283 and accompanying text.
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players for illegal conduct and wreaking havoc on the competitive
nature of these leagues.285
Dana A. Gittleman*
285. See Hanson, supra note 21, at 372 (speculating impact of Williams case on
competition and integrity of professional sports). See generally Brief of Major
League Baseball et al., supra note 238 (stating goal of fair competition and sup-
porting NFL's position regarding uniform enforcement of drug policies).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Emory
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